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ABSTRACT
Negotiation and Autonomy in a 
Fast Food Restaurant
by
Eric Orion Silva
Dr. Ronald W. Smith, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Sociology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
This study is an attempt to apply the negotiated order perspective to the analysis of 
the lived experience of workers in two franchised fast food restaurants. Drawing 
primarily on the work of Anselm Strauss (1978) and D.H.J. Morgan (1975), I have 
examined data taken from auto-ethnographic and overt observation. I found that workers 
in different negotiation contexts would use implicit and explicit negotiation to achieve 
internal and external goals. Worker’s negotiation strategies depended on the actor’s 
individual proclivities and their interpretation of the negotiation context. Issues subject to 
negotiation included wages, the schedule, the amount o f effort expended, and the 
definition of deviance. Employees may occupy core or peripheral status within the 
restaurant, and their status relates to what types of goals may be achieved within the 
setting. Autonomy may become a bargaining piece in the ongoing negotiations, with 
employees and franchisees often trading autonomy for wages or number o f hours.
Ill
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The analytical line between process and structure divides sociologists. Decades of 
systematic social scientific inquiry have failed to elucidate the line between agency and 
structure. Structural functionalists have tended to focus on the deterministic affects of 
social structure, while ignoring human agency. Symbolic interactionists have been 
accused of placing too much emphasis on human agency and ignoring structural forces 
(Maines 1977; Strauss 1978). Because formal organizations are one nexus between micro 
and macro realities, they provide an optimal site to study the interplay between the 
individual and society (Hall 1999). This particular investigation will consider the agency 
of workers in fast food restaurants. If anyone is trapped in Max Weber’s “Iron Cage” of 
rationalization, it is the stereotypical image o f the fast food worker, mindlessly pressing 
cash register buttons with pictures o f sandwiches in place o f numbers and mouthing 
scripts (“Would you like fries with that?”). The freedom or autonomy that can exist in 
this milieu may have implications for the notion of human freedom in other rationalized 
environments.
Ronald Smith has noted that functionalists focus on the structure of organizations, 
while other sociologists focus “on the organizational member and on the way that 
individual feelings impinge on organizational life” (1984:101). Like Smith, this study 
will approach organizational life from an actor’s perspective. By taking individual
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motivations, rational and nonrational, alike into consideration we may improve our 
understanding o f individual freedom in organizations. The analysis will consider relevant 
structural features, which include economic forces (i.e. the unemployment rate), cultural 
norms and laws (i.e. racism and board of health regulations).
The lived experience o f fast food workers will be analyzed from the negotiated order 
perspective, first developed by Anselm Straus et al. (1963). The negotiated order 
perspective, which draws on the assumptions of symbolic interactionism, offers a means 
to understand the interaction between structure and agency. Although the negotiated 
order perspective may be used to analyze social order at the micro and macro levels, its 
practitioners have tended to study organizations (Maines 1977). Studies in negotiated 
order demonstrate how social order is maintained through interaction. Oftentimes, the 
perspective has been used to analyze how individual autonomy is created and preserved 
in an organization (Maines 1977). This perspective, which can demonstrate the existence 
and limitations of agency in a restrictive organization, has been ignored in the literature 
concerning fast food workers.
In this study, I am exploring the lived experience of workers in franchised fast food 
restaurants. Restaurant workers are defined as employees that receive a relatively low 
hourly wage and whose primary tasks are customer service, food preparation, and 
sanitation. For the purposes o f this research, franchised fast food restaurants have the 
following features. First, they are one of a chain or number o f restaurants, operated by 
different franchisees, offering similar menus and décor, which have been decided upon 
by a single franchisor. Second, a franchisor has created a formally rational system for the 
scientific management of the labor process, which reduces labor costs, as well as meal
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
cost and food preparation time. Third, to paraphrase a portion o f Robert Emerson’s 
definition of fast food, customers order from a counter or drive-through window 
(1979:53). The franchisor is the individual or group that creates and maintains the 
standards of operation for a given chain of restaurants. The fi-anchisee(s) is the individual 
or individuals who operate(s) a fi-anchised restaurant according to a rationalized plan. In 
my analysis, I will describe my observations fi-om two, franchised fast food restaurants, 
that I will name Anna’s and Grinders.'
Goals of the Study
In this study, auto-ethnographic and participant observational data is analyzed from 
the negotiated order perspective. In doing so. I have four main objectives. The first goal 
is to describe the processes of negotiation that occur in a fast food restaurant, and 
particularly the processes whereby workers attempt to achieve their personal ends. The 
negotiated order perspective is relatively undeveloped (Strauss 1978). This study will 
further improve the negotiated order perspective by reworking the existing sensitizing 
concepts and expanding the perspective to a new milieu. This research improves our 
understanding of highly restricted social orders with the negotiated order perspective. The 
second goal is to understand the nature o f autonomy in a rationalized environment. How 
and under what circumstances will workers increase their autonomy? The third goal of 
the study is to expand the negotiated order perspective. The fourth aim of the study is to 
expand the substantive understanding o f fast food restaurants. There are a number of 
ethnographic studies o f fast food restaurants, however they tend to focus on restaurants
' The names o f  both restaurants and all individuals (except for my own) have been changed.
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that have large highly differentiated crews. By examining fast food restaurants that have 
smaller and less complex crews 1 hope to offer a useful contrast to the existing research.
The first research question is “How do low-level fast food restaurant workers achieve 
their goals?” To understand how workers in an increasingly rationalized world are able to 
achieve their ends despite limited power, I describe the various types o f individuals who 
influence the social order. Next, I provide a typology of possible issues that workers 
negotiate for in a fast food restaurant as well as an explanation of how the structural 
features o f the environment impinged on the negotiations.
The second set o f research questions involves an attempt to understand how the 
negotiated order perspective is used to understand highly rationalized work places. As the 
service sector o f the North American economy continues to expand and become 
rationalized, it is increasingly important for scholars to understand the ramifications o f 
these changes (Ritzer 1993). Although, the factory continues to be an important site of 
sociological inquiry, sociologists who are interested in understanding how workers are 
able to use their agency to create autonomous spaces in the face of scientific management 
should also look to the service sector o f the economy. This study seeks to develop the 
negotiated order perspective to aid in that effort.
The third purpose o f this research is to increase sociological understanding of 
individual autonomy in highly regulated settings. Fast food restaurants, like factories, are 
governed by a strict formal rationality that attempts to control workers through scientific 
management. Not surprisingly, the goals of employers often differ from the goals o f  fast 
food workers (Leidner 1993; Royle 2000). While a number of researchers have 
considered the nature o f autonomy in fast food restaurants, none have applied the
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negotiated order perspective to this endeavor (Garson 1988; Reiter 1991; Leidner 1993; 
Newman 1999; Royle 2000; Tannock 2001). Moreover, those who have used the 
negotiated order perspective have tended to analyze milieus that clearly demonstrate 
issues of negotiation (for instance Strauss et al. 1981; Hall and Hall 1982; Kleinman 
1982; Levy 1982; Spencer 1993). These sociologists have focused heavily on 
professionals and how they achieve their shared and divergent goals through interaction. 
In as much as these studies are helpful in demonstrating how social order is maintained 
through interaction, they collectively ignore social situations that are less readily 
amenable to the existing analytical tools of negotiated order. However, the negotiated 
order perspective is founded on the notion that “A social order-even the most repressive- 
without some forms o f negotiation would be inconceivable” (Strauss 1978:ix). Therefore, 
the negotiated order perspective may be used to examine the most oppressive 
environments, so it is necessary to study how processes of negotiation affect the social 
order of settings that are rigidly defined.
Fast food restaurants present an appropriate challenge to a researcher who wants to 
understand how people may have limited freedom in seemingly restricted environments. 
Simply delineating autonomy, defined as “the absence of external constraint” is not the 
end goal of this research, rather; it is to understand how workers are able to achieve their 
own goals when they are at variance with those o f management (Katz 1968:4). The 
degree to which workers are successful at achieving goals that are in conflict with 
managerial goals is dependent on their autonomy. Workers will be successful at 
achieving goals that are at variance with management to the extent to which they are not 
controlled by management. Conversely, when workers’ goals are in line with managerial
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goals, or where their goals are dependent upon the achievement o f managerial goals, 
workers may choose not to negotiate for autonomy.
The fourth objective o f the research is to improve the already thorough sociological 
literature on fast food restaurants. The existing ethnographic studies o f fast food 
restaurants and workers have focused on restaurants that are similar to McDonald’s 
(Garson 1988; Reiter 1991; Leidner 1993; Newman 1999; Royle 2001; Tannock 2001). 
McDonald’s, although highly recognized, is not the only form that fast food restaurants 
may take. Owing to differences in investment capital, menu, and volume o f business, 
there are thousands of fast food restaurants that are organized differently from 
McDonald’s and Burger King. These restaurants, while similar in terms of 
rationalization, differ in terms of crew size and differentiation or division o f labor. There 
is a considerable diversity in franchised fast food restaurants. This diversity exists within 
and between different chains. Some restaurants are franchisees, while others are company 
owned. Some restaurants are highly differentiated and have large crews, while others 
have a simple division of labor and have very small crews (Eberts and Gisler 1989). 
Although I am assuming that the social order of all fast food restaurants is based on 
implicit and explicit negotiation, I expect that negotiations will be much easier to observe 
at smaller, less highly differentiated franchised restaurants. The greater structural 
autonomy of franchisees and employees in less complex restaurants allows an observer to 
more readily understand the workplace interactions. Although, there are thousands fast 
food restaurants in the United States that meet this description, they are largely ignored in 
current discourse over fast food restaurants. This study will consider two franchisees that 
tend to have a more simplistic structure. The variable crew size and worker specialization
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contributes to differences in the lived experience of fast food workers. This study will 
add to the existing literature, which does not account for these differences.
Study Overview
In chapter two, I will present a review of the scientific literature. The relevance of the 
processes o f rationalization and scientific management to the study will be examined.
Fast food restaurants are based on a scientific management o f workers, where 
management seeks to control most workers’ acts, consequently reducing their autonomy. 
Workers who attempt to achieve their goals often have to negotiate for increased 
autonomy to do so. Then I will explain the negotiated order perspective and how it may 
be used to examine fast food restaurants by discussing the perspective in relation to 
existing ethnographic literature. In chapter three, I will describe the methodology 
employed in the study. I discuss my decision to use auto-ethnographic and observational 
data and the selection of settings. Lastly, 1 consider the ethical issues that are pertinent to 
the study. In chapter four, the data will be presented and analyzed from the negotiated 
order perspective. First, the two franchises and the individuals who are involved in 
negotiations are described. Next, the aspects of negotiations in fast food restaurants are 
explained. Lastly, a typology o f issues that may be negotiated for by workers is 
presented. In chapter five, the study is brought to a conclusion. I review the findings in 
the analysis chapter, assess the study’s achievements, and discuss how we may generalize 
from the findings.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter will review ethnographic literature on fast food workers. 1 will present 
some of the findings o f these researchers to show how issues of negotiation relate to fast 
food work. Before reviewing ethnographic literature, this chapter will review the work of 
Weber, Harry Braverman, and George Ritzer who theorize about the reduction of worker 
autonomy. While the ethnographers demonstrate the lived experience o f workers, Weber, 
Ritzer, and Braverman place the experiences o f workers within the context of 
rationalization. This chapter will show how the negotiated order perspective might better 
exhibit how workers are able to resist formal rational job designs as well as the 
limitations of worker agency.
Rationalization, Deskilling, and the 
Fast Food Restaurant 
Weber, writing at the turn of the century, explained how the western world was 
increasingly becoming rationalized. In the 1970s, Braverman argued that employers 
deskill jobs to further control and marginalize their employees. More recently, Ritzer has 
reasoned that the process of rationalization is continuing to dominate a globalized society 
and that rationalization is now exemplified by the rise of the fast food restaurant. All 
three theorists argue that the boundaries o f human freedom or autonomy have been 
substantially restricted.
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The Iron Cage of Formal Rationality
A sociological consideration of rationalized food service must begin with Weber
whose ideal type of bureaucracy exemplifies how the Western world is increasingly
becoming governed by formally rational social action. Weber feared that society would
become trapped in an “Iron Cage” of rationality (1997:181). Generations o f sociologists
have been concerned with the accuracy of this grim prediction. Rationalization refers to
the expansion of a particular type o f rationality, namely formal rationality. George Ritzer
explains Weber’s use of the term:
formal rationality means that the search by people for the 
optimum means to a given end is shaped by rules, 
regulations, and larger social structures. Thus, individuals 
are not left to their own devices in searching for the best 
means of attaining a given objective. Rather, there exist 
rules, regulations, and structures that either predetermine or 
help them discover the optimum methods (emphasis in 
original) (1993:19).
Of course, the best means to a given end may not be the best means for everyone. 
Procedures that may be the best for some may not meet the goals of others. According to 
Weber, rationalization with its emphasis on calculability, technical understanding, and 
formal rules has increasingly come to rule social life. The emphasis on using scientific 
principles to order the economic world leads to a replacement o f moral relations by 
market relations (Schroeder 1992:124). Rationalization has encouraged people to view 
each other in terms of their economic relation to one another not in terms of their 
common humanity as dictated to them by the increasingly disavowed religious 
institutions.
Rationalization, according to Weber, is taking place in ail spheres of Western society. 
In the economic sphere, “rationalization involved the organization of commercial
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practices by means of technical rules calculated to produce profits by the use of rational
accounting methods” (Morrison 1995:218). Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills note:
Even so ‘inward’ and apparently subjective an area of 
experience as that of music lends itself to a sociological 
treatment under Weber’s concept o f ‘rationalization.’ The 
fixation o f clang patterns, by a more concise notation and 
the establishment of the well-tempered scales;
‘harmonious’ tonal music and the standardization of the 
quartet o f woodwinds and string instruments as the core of 
the symphony orchestra (1946:51).
For Weber, the emergence of bureaucracy with its highly rationalized form of 
administration is the quintessential example of how social life has become rationalized. 
Weber constructed a picture o f what an “ideal” bureaucracy would look like. The salient 
features of the bureaucracy include: a high division o f labor, hierarchical structure, 
codified employee roles, impersonal and impartial social relations, and lastly, 
appointment and promotion is based on technical competence (1946:196-198). The 
results of bureaucratization are routinization, impersonality, and the general restriction of 
idiosyncratic behavior. In short, rationalization not only reduces individual autonomy; it 
destroys the creative agency of the individual actor.
Weber recognizes both positive and negative aspects of rationality. It is positive in 
that it allows for greater precision, objectivity, and calculability. The impersonality of 
bureaucracies allows them to operate “without regard for persons” (1946:215). Weber 
writes, “Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through 
the principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective 
considerations” (1946:215). Lastly, bureaucratic administration manipulates actions 
along “calculable rules.” Weber writes, “The peculiarity o f modem culture, and
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specifically o f its technical and economic basis, demands this very ‘calculability’ o f 
results” (1946:215).
Despite the benefits afforded by bureaucracy, Weber was very mindful o f the
downside of bureaucratization. For Weber, the bureaucracy exemplified the impending
Iron Cage of rationality that may come to descend upon individuals in the modem world.
He writes, “Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those social structures
which are hardest to destroy” (1946:228). The permanency of the bureaucracy may be
deleterious for those who are subsumed within its structure. Weber states
The individual bureaucrat cannot squirm out of the 
apparatus in which he is harnessed. In contrast to the 
honorific or avocational ‘notable’ the professional 
bureaucrat is chained to his activity by his entire material 
and ideal existence. In the great majority of cases, he is 
only a single cog in an ever-moving mechanism which 
prescribes to him an essentially fixed route of march”
(1946:228).
Weber uses the “ideal type” of bureaucracy to illustrate how rationalization might 
reduce human agency. In the concluding paragraphs o f the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
o f Capitalism, Weber wams against a possible future where all aspects o f life have 
become rationalized, a world where people's roles are locked into an iron cage inhabited 
by “specialists without spirit, and sensualists with out heart” ([1930] 1997:182).
Scientific Management and the 
Degradation o f Labor
Braverman, in Labor and Monopoly Capital, explains how capitalists have come to 
bring about the “division of labor in the workshop” which, occurs when job tasks are 
analyzed and dissected into small parts (1974:75). These parts are then assigned to 
different workers. The division of crafts, performed by skilled craftsmen into tasks
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performed by many unskilled workers significantly reduces the cost o f production. This 
division is only worthwhile however when production is high (1975). Consequently, 
skills are “destroyed” for most workers, while those “relatively few persons for whom 
special knowledge and training are reserved are freed so far as possible from the 
obligations o f simple labor. In this way, a structure is given to all labor processes that at 
its extremes polarizes those whose time is infinitely valuable and those whose time is 
worth almost nothing” (Braverman 1974:82-83).
Braverman describes how scientific management has succeeded in brining about this
division of labor. Fredrick Taylor, the father o f scientific management, was an innovator
in managerial control, as he was the first to assert “as an absolute necessity fo r  adequate
management the dictation to the worker o f  the precise manner in which work is to be
performed" (emphasis in original) (1975:90). Additionally, Taylor redefined the notion of
‘a fair day’s work’ to “all the work a worker can do without injury to his health, at a pace
that can be sustained throughout a working lifetime” (Braverman 1974:97). Braverman
summarizes Taylor’s thought:
So long as [workers] retain their grip on the labor process 
itself, they will thwart efforts to realize to the full the 
potential inherent in their labor power. To change this 
situation, control over the labor process must pass into the 
hands of management, not only in a formal sense but by the 
control and dictation of each step in the process, including 
its mode of performance (1975:100).
Scientific management is based on three principles. First, is the separation of the
knowledge of how to perform a task from the act of performing a task (Braverman:
1974:113). Second, management should be in possession of the knowledge of the labor
process; this knowledge should be transmitted to workers on a ‘need to know’ basis
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(Braverman 1974). The third principle is “the use of this monopoly over knowledge to 
control each step o f the labor process and its mode of execution” (Braverman 1974:119). 
Scientific management is the vehicle for the formal rational control o f the capitalists.
Braverman provides a detailed discussion o f the effects of Taylor’s scientific
management. He writes, “The physical processes of production are now carried out more
or less blindly, not only by the workers who perform them, but often by lower ranks of
supervisory employees as well. The production units operate like a hand, watched,
corrected, and controlled by a distant brain” (1974:125). Braverman is continuing the
Marxian argument that capitalism serves to dehumanize and devalue workers, culturally
and economically. He explains how workers who had previously developed their minds
are slowly stripped of their intellectual faculties. Braverman reports:
the craft provided a daily link between science and work, 
since the craftsman was constantly called upon to use 
rudimentary scientific knowledge, mathematics, drawing, 
etc., in his practice. Such craftsmen were an important part 
of the scientific public of their time, and as a mle exhibited 
an interest in science and culture beyond that connected 
directly to their work (1974:135).
However, as scientific management denuded workers of their skill, they lost their desire
for higher learning. Scientific management has destroyed the autonomy that they had
previously possessed. Braverman relates the anger of one pundit sympathetic to the plight
of workers during the Tayloristic revolution in the 1910s “the worker is no longer a
craftsman in any sense, but is an animated tool o f the management” (quoted in
Braverman 1974:136). When the process o f rationalization described by Weber was
applied to the labor process as scientific management, the result was the devolution o f the
working class.
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McDonaldization
Weber, who died shortly before White Castle restaurants came to prominence in the 
1920s (Jakle and Sculle 1999), never publicly wrote about the rationalization of food 
service. However, his elucidation o f the process o f rationalization in Western society 
clearly informs contemporary research on the subject. Seventy years after Weber’s death, 
and nearly two decades after Labor and Monopoly Capital, Ritzer, in his widely popular 
book. The McDonaldization o f  Society, claims that the process o f rationalization is very 
much in full force, and that even the sphere of consumption has become rationalized. 
Ritzer asserts that while Weber viewed bureaucracy as the “paradigm case o f rationality,” 
he thinks that this should be updated to McDonald’s (1993:18-19). He labeled the 
current rationalization of society McDonaldization, which is defined as ""the process by 
which the principles o f  the fast food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more 
sectors o f American society as well as the rest o f  the world” (emphasis in original) 
(1993:1). Ritzer argues that McDonaldization is an “extension of the Weberian theory of 
rationalization” (1993:18). In using the term McDonaldization, Ritzer is not only 
referring to McDonald’s per se, but also any equivalent organization (i.e. Seven Eleven or 
Jiffy Lube) (1993:xiii). Ritzer outlines the rational dimensions of McDonald’s and similar 
organizations: efficiency, calculability, predictability, and control (1993).
Similar to Weber’s concept of an Iron Cage, Ritzer takes note of the negative aspects 
of rationalization for employees. Ritzer argues that McDonaldized organizations 
dehumanize customers and employees alike. He writes, “The fast food restaurant offers 
its employees a dehumanizing setting within which to work.” as “workers are asked to 
use only a minute proportion of all their skills and abilities” (1993:131). Fast food
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restaurants are dehumanizing in that they “minimize contact among human beings”
(1993:133). The relationship between customers and employees is “rushed” due to an
emphasis on speed and “fleeting” due to high turnover rates (1993:133). Moreover, fast
food restaurants are dehumanizing for employees, “Because employees remain on the job
for only a few months, satisfying personal relationships among employees are unlikely to
develop” (1993:134). Ritzer contends that fast food workers will be unable to improve
their work conditions. He writes:
One can predict that McDonald’s will not significantly alter 
its working conditions until it is unable to find a steady 
supply of new workers. Even then, it may simply move in 
the direction of eliminating human employees rather than 
humanizing the work. If this is the case, we can expect to 
see more automation and robotization in the fast-food 
restaurants o f the future (1993:169).
In, The McDonaldization Thesis, Ritzer (1998) includes a chapter titled, “McJobs: 
McDonaldization and Its Relationship to the Labor Process” where he explores the affect 
o f rationalization on the labor process (1998:61). He paints an incredibly bleak picture of 
fast food employment. Ritzer decries the power o f capitalists to control workers. Ritzer 
claims that McDonald’s has succeeded in controlling not only the actions o f workers but 
also their diction (suggestive selling) and affectation (an emphasis on smiling). He writes, 
“McDonaldized jobs are tightly scripted: they are characterized by both routineized 
actions...and scripted interactions” (emphasis in original) (1998:63-64). According to 
Ritzer, corporations completely dominate workers who possess little to no autonomy. He 
relates, “Beyond the usual exploitation o f being paid less than the value of what they 
produce, McDonald’s employees are often not guaranteed that they will work the number 
of hours they are supposed to on a given day. If  business is slow, they may be sent home
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
16
early in order that the employer can economize on labor cost” (1998:66). Additionally, 
McDonald’s successfully appropriates customers, who now perform tasks formally 
assigned to employees, such as busing one’s table, significantly reducing labor costs. 
Consequently, employees are more expendable and have even less room to resist their 
employers. Ritzer argues that franchisees, the owners o f the individual restaurants, 
maintain very little autonomy. Despite the fact that they provide much of the capital for 
their restaurant, they exercise limited control over it. Ritzer writes, “The operators take 
much of the financial risk, while the franchise companies sit back and (often) rake in the 
profits. In addition, the franchise companies frequently have detailed rules, regulations, 
and even inspectors that they use to control the operators” (1998:68).
Currently workplace repression is facilitated by structural and cultural forces that 
augment managerial efforts to control workers. An example of structural control can be 
found in the
drive-through window associated with the fast food 
restaurant... structures both what customers in their cars 
and employees in their booths can and cannot do. They can 
efficiently exchange money for food, but their positions (in 
a car and a booth) and the press of other cars in the queue 
make any kind of personal interaction virtually impossible 
(1998:62).
Moreover, individuals come to accept McDonaldization, subsequently destroying all 
resistance (1998:68). In fact, “workers and customers often both buy into 
McDonaldization and are actively involved in its creation” (1998:66). Workers who 
cannot conceive of an alternative to the reified state o f affairs cannot be expected to 
reorder their environment.
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Braverman, Ritzer, and Weber describe a world where the economic elite has 
successfully rationalized the world for their own benefit and to the detriment of low-level 
employees. Ritzer expands on Weber to show how fast food workers have very little 
autonomy or ability to gain more through negotiation. A number of ethnographers have 
examined the lived experience of fast food workers. Although these ethnographic 
presentations have considered issues of worker autonomy and negotiations, they have not 
done so from the negotiated order perspective. The next section will provide an overview 
of the negotiated order perspective and its relevance to the lived experience of fast food 
workers. It should be noted that there has been considerable literature analyzing the 
interaction processes among organizational members. Some classic studies include Karl 
Weick’s (1979) analysis of the sense making processes among actors (i.e. the “double 
interact”). Granovetter’s (1985) analysis of social networking as related to decision 
making (i.e. “embeddedness”). Lastly, Randall Stokes and John Hewitt’s (1976) study of 
role taking and adjustment to the behavior o f others (i.e. “Alignment of Actions”). 
However, this research does not focus on the micro social psychological processes 
involved, but instead describes how workers act to satisfy their motivations, solely in the 
tradition of work from the negotiated order perspective.
The Negotiated Order Perspective 
The negotiated order perspective is an attempt by interactionist sociologists to 
account for the relationship between structure and agency in social life, particularly in 
organizations. Gary Alan Fine (1996) lists the critical assumptions of the negotiated order 
perspective. The first is that social order is based on negotiation (1996:3). Social order 
results from the process o f negotiation. Strauss writes, “Even dictators find it impossible
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss ion  of th e  copyrigh t ow ner.  F u r th e r  rep roduction  prohibited w ithout perm iss ion .
IS
and inexpedient simply and always to order command, demand, threaten, manipulate, or 
use force; about some issues and activities they must persuade and negotiate” (1978:ix). 
Social order is not a priori; rather it is created through interaction. The second assumption 
is “specific negotiations are contingent on the structure o f the organization and the field 
in which the organization operates” (1996:3-4). Power differentials affect negotiations in 
patterned ways. There are structural features such as laws, normative values, and 
economic forces, which affect negotiations. The third assumption is that negotiations are 
impermanent. They must be continually renewed (1996:3). Lastly, “structural changes in 
the organization require a revision of the negotiated order” (1996:3). In as much as 
negotiations are impermanent and affected by structural features, the social order will 
have to be renegotiated when structural features change.
Strauss defines negotiations as “one o f the possible means of “getting things 
accomplished” when parties need to deal with each other to get those things done” 
(1978:2). He attempts to differentiate negotiations fi-om “other modes of attaining desired 
ends-such as persuasion, education, appeal to authority, or the use o f coercion or coercive 
threat” (1978:2). Strauss’ concept of negotiation is the quintessential example of a 
sensitizing concept (Blumer 1954) in that there is no clear and distinct definition of 
negotiation that can be made independent of context. Research from the negotiated order 
perspective has demonstrated that negotiations may take on a number o f different forms 
depending on the situation (Morgan 1975; Strauss 1978). These modes may be used in 
different combinations in different situations.
Strauss identifies three main analytical dimensions in the negotiated order 
perspective. These dimensions include the negotiations, the structural context, and the
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negotiation context. The first is a description o f the negotiations. Strauss states, “Included
in the descriptions will be the accompanying interactions, types o f actors, their strategies
and tactics” as well as “consequences” and “subprocesses o f negotiation” (1978:98). This
dimension includes the motivations o f the social actors, how they go about gaining what
they want, and how successful they are. Researchers analyzing a social setting fi-om the
negotiated order perspective must describe the types of negotiation that occur. A
description o f the negotiations should elucidate, what Strauss terms “the subprocesses of
negotiation” that are exemplified by “tradeoffs, obtaining kickbacks, compromising
toward the middle, paying off debts, and reaching negotiated agreements” (1978:237).
The subprocesses are behaviors engaged in by actors who are negotiating with one
another. The subprocesses of negotiation are not necessarily expressed through verbal
communication. The term negotiation is a sensitizing concept. Therefore, negotiations
may take forms that are not usually associated with the denotations o f the word. For
instance, negotiations may be explicit or implicit. At times, individuals explicitly work
out an arrangement, while at other times the following pertains:
Negotiations may be very brief, made without any verbal 
exchange or obvious gestural manifestation; nevertheless, 
the parties may be perfectly aware of “what they are 
doing”-they may not call this negotiating bargaining, but 
they surely regard its product as some sort of worked-out 
agreement. Other negotiations may be so implicit that the 
respective parties may not be thoroughly aware that they 
have engaged in or completed a negotiated transaction. If 
the latter kind of agreement gets broken by one person, 
however, the other is sure to experience some feeling, 
whether surprise, disappointment, annoyance, anger, or 
even a sense of betrayal or exploitation, but possibly also 
relief or unexpected pleasure (Strauss 1978:224-225).
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As will become clear below, the existence of implicit negotiations may exist in situations 
where explicit negotiation has seemingly been squashed.
The second dimension is the structural context. Strauss states “the structural context 
is that “within which” the negotiations take place, in the largest sense” (1978:98). 
Essentially, he is referring to the larger structural features that affect negotiations. 
Structural features may include the demography, economy, laws, cultural norms such as 
racism or sexism, infrastructure, and geography that influence the negotiation context.
The negotiated order perspective does not assign deterministic qualities to the structural 
context. Strauss writes, “Structural context is larger, more encompassing than negotiation 
context, but the lines o f impact can run either way. That is, changes in the former may 
impact on the latter, and vice versa” (emphasis in original) (1978:101).
The negotiation context is the analytical structure that houses the interaction. He 
provides a number of variables that relate to negotiation context such as the number of 
actors, the stakes o f the negotiation, the relative power of the negotiators, the openness of 
negotiations, the number and clarity of negotiated issues, and the “options to avoiding or 
discontinuing negotiation” (1978:100). The negotiation context consists of what directly 
affects the negotiations. Strauss differentiates between structural and negotiation 
contexts. He claims “the structural context bears directly on the negotiation context, but 
the latter refers more specifically to the structural properties entering very directly as 
conditions into the course o f the negotiation itself’ (1978:99). In as much as the 
proceeding concepts are sensitizing concepts, researchers have added to the list proposed 
by Strauss. For example, Noreen Sugrue has argued that “emotions can and do become 
properties of negotiation contexts” (1982:280).
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Emotions and Negotiation 
Sugrue posits, “Each participant negotiates from a particular emotion standpoint. That 
is, while each may acknowledge that the emotion context is one of, say anger, one person 
may have intense feelings leading to that emotion, while the other may not have those 
feelings” (emphasis in original) (1982:281). Although “there can be a sharing of similar 
or parallel feelings, but not o f identical feelings. The concept of emotion standpoint thus 
allows for the analysis of each person’s perspective during negotiations that are directly 
influenced by emotion context” (1982:281). This revelation brings up two important 
points pertinent to the negotiated order perspective. The first is that negotiations contain 
rational as well as extrarational factors. This aspect distinguishes the negotiated order 
perspective from rational choice or exchange theory. Second, a researcher from the 
negotiated order perspective must carefully understand the position of the individual 
negotiators. There will never be one uniform perspective of “the workers” even when 
they engage in collective bargaining. In any social order, voluntary or involuntary, 
members come from slightly different perspectives. Therefore, it is imperative that 
researchers avoid conflating the perspectives o f workers. An analysis from the negotiated 
order perspective should consider the “existential selves” (Smith 1984) of a given milieu.
Negotiated Order and Symbolic Interactionism 
Negotiated order is one way that symbolic interactionists have attempted to 
understand social order (Maines 1977). As such, it is based on the same assumptions as 
symbolic interactionism. Symbolic interactionists seek to understand “the actual 
formation of conduct in social interaction and not to assiune that social and cultural 
patterns by themselves explain conduct. In this task they emphasize meaning, arguing
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1994:25-26). Additionally, “symbolic interactionists view human beings not only as 
shaped by culture and society, but also as capable o f shaping them... culture and society 
depend upon human actions constructed on the basis of meanings formed in everyday 
social interaction” (Hewitt 1994:26). The negotiated order perspective rests on these 
implicit assumptions.
Concepts such as negotiation, negotiation context, and structural contexts are
examples o f Herbert Blumer’s notion of sensitizing concepts (1954). Blumer writes,
“Because of the varying nature of the concrete expression from instance to instance we
have to rely, apparently, on general guides and not on fixed traits or modes of
expression” (1954:149). Moreover, these “general guidelines” or “sensitizing concepts”
are to be “tested, improved and refined” (Blumer 1954:149-150). Clearly influenced by
Blumer, Strauss writes:
These properties o f negotiation contexts are not logical 
constructs, but emerged from the examination o f numerous 
instances o f negotiation.. .whenever properties are salient in 
a given case involving negotiations; I bring them out in 
analyzing the specific negotiation context for that case. The 
chief consideration... is the relevance, not “logic,” in 
developing the specific typologies or analyses o f context.
One must judge for oneself the fit and relevance of these 
negotiation contexts to the specific cases o f negotiation to 
which they are applied. Their various permutations and 
clustering constitute the explanations for the specific kinds 
o f negotiators, interactions, tacit, strategies, subprocesses of 
negotiation, and consequences that will be discussed. Of 
course, it is expected that this list o f useful properties of the 
negotiation context will be added to by other researchers as 
they do their own studies” (1978:100).
Strauss’ preceding discussion of how he intends to study negotiations mirrors Blumer’s
notion o f a “sensitizing concept” (1954).
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As a variant o f symbolic interaction, the negotiated order perspective is based in large 
part on the work of George Herbert Mead. David Maines explains Mead’s influence on 
negotiated order, “among Mead’s many contributions to sociological thought was the 
argument that human conduct cannot be properly understood unless the social 
organizational matrices in which conduct takes place are first understood” (1977:244). 
Maines also discusses the relevance of Mead’s work on the interpretation o f the past. He 
writes.
Mead argued that the past is not only continually being 
redefined in light o f the present, but that it has a structuring 
effect on what is likely to occur in the present. He presents 
us with a dialectical view encompassing structure and 
process, determinacy and indeterminacy. It is that 
dialectical perspective that lies at the base of the negotiated 
order, and that appears in a number o f studies informed by 
that perspective” (1975:244).
The negotiated order perspective adapts Mead’s notion that structure and process must be
viewed together.
Negotiated Order and Employee Autonomy 
Maines reports, “issues pertaining to autonomy are central” in analyses conducted 
from the negotiated order perspective (1977:245). D. H. J. Morgan uses the negotiated 
order perspective to explain how workers are able to gain and maintain autonomy within 
their jobs (1975). Morgan uses Fredrick Katz’s definition of autonomy “as the absence of 
external constraint” (1968:4). Katz argues, “workers have considerable autonomy within 
the confines of the organization. Even when work is prescribed in exact detail, the work 
role tends to be defined narrowly. This situation leaves a considerable portion of the 
workers life within the work organization undefined' (emphasis in original) (1968:47). 
While Morgan accepts Katz’s argument that factory workers have autonomy within the
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organization he does not accept Katz’s structural functionalist portrayal o f autonomy,
which “accords the worker a relatively passive role in the organization, a willing object
of managerial repressive tolerance” (1975:207). Morgan then discusses the negotiated
order of the workplace. He asserts:
The concept of “negotiation” has arisen out of the 
realization that human behavior cannot readily be 
understood simply by reference back to a normative order 
or, in the case of organizational settings, to a set o f rules...
The social order of say, a workplace is not a once-and-for- 
all accomplishment brought about by either the ultimate 
threat o f force, deprivation, or a postulated harmony of 
interests, but is something which is subject to continuous 
negotiation. (1975:209).
Morgan challenges Strauss’ notion of negotiation. Morgan uses the concept of
negotiation as a “generalized metaphor for human conduct” (1975). Instead of only
focusing on explicit negotiations, sociologists should recognize two levels of negotiation.
The first is
An everyday covert implicit substratum of negotiation. The 
appropriateness of the use o f the negotiation is determined 
by the problem under investigation and indeed, the 
negotiation between the investigator and his critical 
professional colleagues.” The second is “a more overt form 
of negotiation which is recognized as such by the 
participants (1975:211).
He maintains that negotiations do not take place amongst equals. Some actors have far
more power than do others. Morgan asserts, “negotiation is not randomly distributed
throughout an organization, but is patterned according to the particular set of statuses
which form the structure of the organization” (1975:211). Morgan concludes that the
negotiated order perspective may actually “draw our attention to those persons whom one
has to take accoimt o f in this process o f negotiation. Thus an emphasis on negotiation, far
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from ignoring the imequal distribution o f power in an organization, in fact draws our 
attention to the sources o f that power, the uses to which it is put, and its limits”
(1975:211-212). Morgan presents the limits o f power. Despite power differentials, “this 
account shows that there are limits to the exercise of managerial or supervisory power. 
These limits are less in terms of formal rules and more in terms o f their expectations of 
what the workers will stand for regarding practices that have now come to be taken as 
given” (1975:224). Additionally, Morgan (1975) explains that autonomy is not static, as 
Katz (1968) professes. Rather it is something that is continually worked out through 
negotiation. Morgan claims, “The two concepts stand in reciprocal relationship to each 
other for autonomy refers to those areas which are, for the time being free from the 
necessity of overt negotiation, while negotiation can be seen as being about the 
enlargement, maintenance, or diminution o f existing sphere of autonomy” (1975:212).
The first area of negotiation, that Morgan analyzes, is the use o f the radios in the 
factory. In the factory, legitimate radio use was defined by a number o f important rules 
such as what programs could be played, and what the volume should be set at. These 
rules were neither clearly defined nor evenly enforced. The workers tended to use the 
radio as they pleased until management enforced the rules. We can see the atomization of 
the workers who did not comprise a uniform bargaining unit. Some workers liked to play 
music loudly, while others did not like the high volume pop music. Conflicts over the 
radios were crudely divided by age, with young women, who were the majority in the 
factory, playing pop music loudly, and a majority faction of older women who did not 
care much for loud pop music. Although the sympathies of management were with the 
older group, management had to respect the wishes of the younger group because “the
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presence o f a group o f younger girls was felt to be necessary for some of the finer 
assembly work” (1975:215). Younger workers by virtue o f their perceived worth to the 
factory were able to compensate for their numerical inferiority. Morgan states that they 
were able to bargain for greater use o f the radios because “it was on the whole easier for 
management not to make an issue of this relatively minor problem and that it meant that 
something could be kept in reserve for bargaining over other more serious matters” 
(1975:216). Morgan contends that radio use represents “an area of autonomy in the 
workshop that was overt, that was o f doubtful legitimacy, but which was generally 
tolerated. However this was not a stable once-and-for-all situation, but was the subject of 
occasional negotiation” (1975:216).
Morgan also examines the negotiation of time in the factory. In a factory, time is 
highly regulated. Unlike radio use, the rules regarding time are clearly delineated with 
time cards and bells. Workers, whose time was highly regulated, engaged in implicit 
negotiations with management over the use o f time. For example, workers would try to 
reduce the number o f hours that they had to work by stopping work early before breaks 
and the end of the day or by lingering over breaks before starting work. Workers would 
also take disguised breaks, for instance, chatting with a co-worker while going to the 
storeroom for supplies. Sometimes management would counter negotiate; for instance, 
the assistant supervisor would sometimes prevent workers from getting their coats early 
by standing near the cloakroom. Management was completely aware o f how the workers 
would find ways to reduce their work time; some estimated that employees were able to 
“waste” an hour per day. Morgan (1975) contends that workers were able to continue this 
behavior because time wasting is a part of an ongoing negotiation with management.
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Management did not stop the practices because they “liked to keep a bargaining counter 
in reserve for use on more strategic occasions” (1975:221). Some actors thought that the 
time wasting had become established slowly and incrementally. Additionally, some 
thought that the time wasting went unchallenged because it was not worth disturbing the 
relationship between workers and management. Morgan argues that management was not 
in complete control o f the situation. He writes, “To say that management could use 
elements in the situation in the more overt processes of negotiation is not to say that it 
was fully able to choose whether to have these elements in the first place nor was it 
necessarily the case that workers responded to them in those terms” (1975:222). Morgan 
adds that negotiation takes place on an individual and group level. Not all workers 
“wasted” time equally. While single worker’s implicit negotiations may have been 
influenced by the implicit negotiations of others, they were conducted at an individual 
level (1975:223).
Fast food restaurants, like factories, are governed by a strict formal rationality that 
seeks, through Tayloristic means to make workers conform to practices that allow for the 
aims of management to come to fruition. The goals o f management are not always 
commensurate with those of fast food workers (Leidner 1993). Wnile a number of 
researchers have considered the nature of autonomy in fast food restaurants, none have 
applied the negotiated order perspective to this endeavor (Garson 1988; Reiter 1991; 
Leidner 1993; Newman 1999; Royle 2000; Tannock 2001). Moreover, those who have 
used the negotiated order perspective have tended to analyze settings that clearly 
demonstrate issues of negotiation. These researchers have focused heavily on skilled 
organizational members and how they seek to achieve their shared and divergent goals
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through interaction (for instance Strauss et al. 1963, 1981; Hall and Hall 1982; Kleinman 
1982; Levy 1982; and Spencer 1993). In as much as these studies are helpful in 
demonstrating how social order is maintained through interaction, they collectively 
ignore social situations that are not readily amenable to the existing analytical tools of 
negotiated order. The perspective may be enriched by further study of settings that are 
rigidly defined.
Morgan’s application of the negotiated order perspective to the study of factory 
workers is an important step in this effort. In his analysis, he argues that although 
behavior in the factory is rigidly constrained by rules, workers negotiate an agreement 
with management that allows both groups to achieve their goals, to some extent. From 
Morgan’s study, we can surmise that when management in a highly rationalized work 
environment suppresses explicit negotiation, it merely takes on different forms (1975). 
Since explicit negotiations over some rules are not possible, workers engage in implicit 
negotiation, wherein, negotiation is imstated and occurs through nonverbal action.
Morgan’s notion of implicit negotiation can be translated into other repressive milieus 
to understand how workers are able to create autonomy where it does not ostensibly exist. 
As previously mentioned, fast food restaurants present an appropriate challenge to a 
researcher, who wishes to understand how people may have limited freedom in 
seemingly restricted environments. As previously stated, demonstrating worker autonomy 
is not the end goal o f this research, rather; it will be to understand how workers are able 
to achieve their own goals when they are at variance with those of management. The 
degree to which workers are successful at achieving goals that are in conflict with 
managerial goals is dependent on their degree o f autonomy.
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Current ethnographic research has tended to depict fast food workers as having 
neither autonomy nor the agency to attain autonomy (Garson 1988; Reiter 1991). While 
fast food workers certainly do not share the levels of autonomy enjoyed by lawyers, 
doctors, and architects, it is difficult to believe that millions of workers have been 
completely controlled by management in all settings. In keeping with the negotiated order 
perspective, I suspect that in different negotiation contexts fast food workers are variably 
capable of negotiating implicitly and explicitly for their ends.
Factors affecting the negotiation context might include: the size of the restaurant; 
whether the restaurant is franchised or company operated, the type of contract between 
the franchisee and the franchisor; the goals of the franchisee; the number of customers 
who patronize the restaurant; the location of the restaurant, the goals of the employees, 
how easily employees may be replaced; whether relations between employees and 
management are primary, secondary, or mixed and no doubt many others. Ethnographic 
research that is cognizant o f the preceding factors (as well as others) that affect the 
negotiation context may be able to demonstrate how order is maintained in the restaurant 
with both parties achieving their goals to enough of an extent so as to make their 
relationship viable.
It should be noted that a number of sociologists have considered the topic of worker 
agency. Michael Burawoy (1979) found that employers do not exercise the degree of 
control of lower level employees reported by Braverman (1974). David Mechanic (1962) 
demonstrates how many low-level workers are able to wield considerable power. Randy 
Hodson (1991) contends that workers play an active role in the construction of their 
social environment. While these studies and others are related to this research, they will
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not be given thorough treatment here for two reasons. First, they are not explicitly from 
the negotiated order perspective. Second, they are not dealing directly with fast food 
restaurants that are the focus of this study.
Fast Food Ethnographies 
A number o f journalists, sociologists, and anthropologists have done ethnographic 
research of routinzed restaurants. This section will attempt to demonstrate how the 
negotiated order perspective could better inform the ethnographic study of fast food 
workers. Strauss suggests that researchers who are “interested in general theory of 
negotiation for its own sake” may analyze existing data (emphasis in original)
(1978:245). Fiuthermore, “their elaborations and qualifications o f a negotiation theory 
would proceed by further theoretical sampling of data from extant negotiation literature 
in many different substantive areas. This secondary analysis could greatly- and probably 
quickly- help to further a general theory” (1978:245). This section of the literature review 
seeks to achieve some of the preceding objectives. Although I will not be using the 
existing data to directly inform a burgeoning theory of negotiations, I will be using the 
existing data to argue that the negotiated order perspective may gain from an analysis of 
fast food restaurants.
Barbara Garson
Barbara Garson’s (1988) publication. The Electronic Sweatshop, provides a 
journalistic account o f how “a combination o f twentieth-century technology and 
nineteenth-century scientific management is turning the Office o f the Future into the 
factory of the past” (1988:10). She argues that employers have appropriated modem 
technology to thoroughly reduce worker autonomy. She claims that the centralization of
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control stems from a desire to reduce costs and an “irrational prejudice against people” 
(1988:13). Garson interviews a number of workers including fast food workers, social 
workers, and stockbrokers. Her presentation of fast food work is o f particular interest 
here.
Garson provides the contents of her interviews with two former crew persons, one 
current crew person, and a recently resigned manager of a corporate owned McDonald’s 
in New York City. The general theme o f the chapter is that McDonald’s has introduced 
computerized systems that have eliminated any self-determination that may be exercised 
by crew workers and management alike. Automated buzzers tell an employee when it is 
okay to pull a fillet o’ fish out of the fryer, a bell beeps when it is time to flip the burgers, 
the condiment guns are calibrated for Big Macs and cheeseburgers, and a computer 
program predicts how many employees will be needed for a given shift. One interviewee 
left after only one day because the managers would not give her the schedule that she 
desired. Another employee, who cannot afford the luxury of quitting, is frequently 
chastised for voiding the register without the assistance of a manager. In short, a 
computerized formal rationality has eradicated any sense o f freedom or creativity. The 
jobs have been deskilled to the point where the most competent crew person can be 
replaced in a matter o f minutes. Even a highly capable manager admits, “Basically, I 
can’t be any more creative than a crew person. I can’t take any more initiative then the 
person on the register” (1988:35).
From her interviews, Garson concludes, McDonald’s has successfully rationalized its
operations. She laments:
By combining twentieth-century computer technology with 
nineteenth- century time and motion studies, the
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McDonald’s corporation has broken the jobs o f griddleman, 
waitress, cashier, and even manager down into small, 
simple, small steps. Historically these have been service 
jobs involving a lot o f flexibility and personal flare. But the 
corporation has systematically extracted the decision­
making elements from filling french fry boxes or 
scheduling staff. They’ve siphoned the know-how from the 
employees into the programs. They relentlessly weed out 
all variables that might make it necessary to make a 
decision at the store level, whether on pickles or on 
cleaning procedures. (1988:37)
Restaurant workers that formally contained a great deal of autonomy have become gears
in a Weberian wheel.
Given these same data, a researcher coming from the negotiated order perspective 
might ask if the structural context (such as unemployment rate, the type o f fast food 
restaurant) might affect the negotiation context. In other words, can we really assume that 
this is the situation that all fast food workers find themselves in or is this one restaurant 
somewhat anomalous? Could it be that structural change, also the result o f negotiation 
(Denzin 1977a, 1978) could alter the negotiation context such that workers (who cared 
to) might be able to negotiate for increased autonomy?
Ester Reiter
Ester Reiter’s ethnography, Making Fast Food, explores the lived experience of fast 
workers in a Burger King restaurant in suburban Toronto. Reiter, like Garson (1988), 
explains how fast food work has been deskilled (1991). For instance, “the cashier inside 
the store does not need to know how to make change to operate the register” (1991:84).
In addition, Reiter relates that interactions are scripted (1991:84). Reiter provides detailed 
descriptions of the restaurant, the promotional hierarchy, worker profile, training, and 
work tasks.
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She explains the motivations for employment at Burger King. The reasons are that it 
fits the schedule of workers (particularly students and mothers), it is among the only jobs 
available to unskilled workers, and the location o f the restaurant is convenient for some 
employees. Reiter identifies scheduling to be of the highest concern for employees. The 
first step to discovering how workers attain their goals is to find out what those goals are. 
Reiter succeeds in this, but does not really explain how workers go about obtaining the 
schedule they desire.
Reiter relates that Burger King rotated its managers in the stores that it owned. She 
writes, “The director explained that they didn’t want the managers to become “stale.” 
This was not very clear to me. Perhaps, I thought, managers who got to know their 
subordinates well would be less likely to stick closely to Burger King rules” (1991:104). 
Reiter provides an example o f a manager who disliked Burger King’s attempt to save 
profits by cutting crewmember hours. Burger King is attempting to prevent the conflation 
of primary and secondary relationships. Like Weber’s ideal type bureaucracy. Burger 
King believes that it is in their best interests to prevent informality between workers and 
managers. Moreover, Burger King makes substantial claims on its employees. She writes, 
employees “are asked to place their responsibilities to Burger King above everything else 
in their lives: school, family, friends.” (1991:107). Burger King, operating according to 
the logic of scientific management, seeks to squeeze as much as it can from its 
employees. Reiter concludes, “just as Taylor considered that workers were ‘soldiering’ if 
they worked at less than their physiological maximum, so Burger King considers that it is 
entitled to the physiological maximum from its minimum wage employees” (1991:120).
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Burger King seeks to increase profitability through a formally rational routinization
of labor. Reiter, like Ritzer (1993) and Garson (1988) discusses the importance of
computers in rationalizing food service. Burger King uses computers to track inventory
and productivity. Computers are also used to decide the most efficient use o f labor.
Technology is used to control (or limit the autonomy of) workers. Reiter provides an
interesting example o f the negotiated interaction between workers and management by
revealing how routinization fails to squash all variance. She writes, this tightly organized
system is not completely predictable.. .Even in a very controlled situation, there are good
days and bad days, good managers and bad managers” (1991:123). Reiter explains:
There is a consensual aspect in translating labour power 
into labour; workers cooperation is needed, even if it is just 
at the level o f showing up on time. However, the kind of 
political power that can be exercised by a worker with 
scarce, not easily obtainable skills... is quite a bit greater 
than that o f a worker who can be instantly replaced by 
another if  she o f he doesn’t smile enough (1991:129).
Essentially, there is more to a fast food restaurant than the Weberian formal rational plan.
No matter what rules are created by upper level management, operations have to be
enforced by managers and followed by employees.
Reiter delineates Burger King’s strategies for controlling its labor force. In addition to 
scientific management. Burger King uses psychology to influence employees (1991:133). 
For instance, management has appropriated Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” and 
Herzberg’s “satisfiers and disatisfiers” to conclude that emotional encouragement can 
satisfy workers, in place o f improved wages, hours, and working conditions (1991:135). 
Reiter concludes that management attempts to extract as much as they can from 
employees before they resign. She writes, “Burger King efforts to martial loyalty are
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focused on creating the kind of morale that will keep work intense and productivity high. 
The attempts to ensure long-term commitment are minimal” (1991:139). Workers are 
given miniscule raises and poor opportimities for advancement. Reiter explains that 
promotion at Burger King is problematic in that “A production leader’s working 
conditions... are actually worse than those for crew, and they achieve little monetary 
gain” (1991:139). Instead, management chooses to use inexpensive methods such as 
social activities, competitions, and managerial encouragement to extract as much effort as 
possible from employees. In addition, the restaurant is designed to allow waiting 
customers to view the employees. Workers are thus pressured to work faster (1991). The 
previous manipulations could be labeled management’s negotiations. A researcher from 
the negotiated order perspective would note that management is attempting to implicitly 
negotiate for their ends with motivational items instead of offering higher wages.
Reiter considers the role o f worker agency. She relates that she was surprised to find
that the management at Burger King had far more power over their employees than she
imagined. She writes:
I assumed... that in a fast food restaurant there were bound 
to be forms of cooperation between workers and some 
mediating power that workers would have over 
management directives... I looked and looked by never 
found this active participation in determining the labour 
process... Workers at Burger King do not have even a 
limited arena in which they can delude themselves into 
thinking of the labour process as a game in which they 
participate via commonly agreed-upon rules. Control o f the 
game and setting the rules of playing are the prerogative of 
Burger King alone. If one does not choose to play by 
Burger King’s rules, one must leave the game entirely 
(1991:141).
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Workers identified favored and distasteful job tasks. Reiter does not report how 
workers vie for preferred tasks. Rather, she seems to imply that workers are simply 
assigned to assorted tasks by a multitude of managers. Workers are pressured to work 
hard regardless o f how many customers are in the restaurant. Workers did not challenge 
(overtly or covertly) managerial authority. She does, however, offer some examples of 
worker resistance. For instance, one worker circumvented a S2.50 limit on free employee 
food by ringing herself up for one item and taking a more expensive one. Another worker 
walked off after continually being denied a brake (1991). Reiter claims that workers' only 
response to unfavorable conditions was to leave. Quitting is the only individual action 
that she recognizes. Reiter presents unionization as the only possible means by which 
workers may successfully negotiate for their goals (1991).
Reiter indicates that Burger King has more or less eradicated worker autonomy. She 
concludes, “there is little personal space at Burger King. The ‘working knowledge’ or 
‘tacit skills’ Burger King workers bring to their jobs give them little room to manceuver 
in the moderating management directives. Even physical needs such as drinking water or 
using the washroom are regulated” (1991 ; 165). Workers have no autonomy and there is 
nothing they can do to negotiate for more autonomy “their individual protests, which 
usually take the form of “voting with their feet”, however, do not change management 
prerogatives in the organization of the workplace” (1991:165). She does not allow for the 
possibility that given some structural changes workers could negotiate for increased 
autonomy.
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Robin Leidner
Robin Leidner’s (1993) ethnography. Fast Food, Fast Talk, focuses on the 
routinization of service work. She presents interview and participant observation data 
from a company owned McDonald’s restaurant and an Insurance company. Leidner’s 
work is of particular interest because her data relate to processes o f negotiation in 
rationalized food service establishments. Leidner argues that employee-employer 
relationships are not intrinsically antagonistic. Moreover, the relationships are not static, 
but change with different situations. Both insights support the negotiated order 
perspective. Rather than focusing only on the relationship between management and 
workers, Leidner posits that the examination of interactive service work (including fast 
food) must include the three-way relationship between workers, management, and 
customers. She writes, “All three parties are trying to arrange the interactions to their own 
advantage, whether they want to maximize speed, convenience, pleasantness, efficiency, 
customization of service, degree of exertion, or any other outcome they feel to be 
beneficial” (1993:3-4). The implication is that when the interests of management and 
workers coincide they may cooperate to see that their own interests are met. In another 
situation, workers and customers may form a temporary alliance against the restaurant 
owners. Alliances shift with the situation. We may observe situations where it is in the 
“self-defined” best interest of workers to comply with routinization (Leidner 1993:135). 
However, in other situations, workers may, successfully resist routinization through 
negotiation and build autonomous spaces for themselves. Leidner finds evidence of 
worker agency. She writes, “Analysis o f routinization is too often cut short by the 
assumption that management has the capacity to impose routines unilaterally, an
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assumption that historical research on routinization has proven untenable” (1993:127). 
Although, not coming from the negotiated order perspective, she demonstrates how the 
social order o f the restaurant is continually recreated through strategic interaction that 
involves patterned negotiations that are affected by structure.
In some instances, routinization can be beneficial to employees. She claims, “workers 
expressed relatively little dissatisfaction with the extreme routinization...” as some 
workers “felt that their interactions with customers were more than mechanical and that 
they were able to express their personalities on the job (1993:134). Other workers, in 
contrast, appreciated the routine precisely because it did not require that they treat 
exchanges with customers as full-fledged personal interactions” (1993:134-135). As 
would be necessary in an analysis from the negotiated order perspective she is identifying 
individual worker goals and how they attain them.
Leidner also demonstrates worker resistance to the aspects of formal rationality that 
they found particularly offensive. For instance, “Workers disobeyed the rule about 
suggestive selling whenever they could get away with it” (1993:140). Her analysis can be 
translated into the negotiated order terminology. She provides data that indicate implicit 
negotiation between managers, workers, and customers concerning suggestive selling. It 
was in management’s best interest for workers to suggest additional products; this 
practice annoyed many customers. Employees “were more likely to resolve this dilemma 
in the customers’ favor, because management had not created any incentives that brought 
the workers interests into line with their own” (1993:140). The divergent interests of 
customers and management affected the social order o f the restaurant. Management 
wants workers to engage in suggestive selling and negotiates for this by asking workers
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to do so. When workers engage in suggestive selling customers often become annoyed, 
they negotiate against this annoyance by acting disparagingly toward employees. 
Employees are caught between customers and management. In this case, the customers’ 
implicit negotiation action (acting aimoyed) is more compelling than management’s 
negotiation (continually requesting but not sanctioning employees) many employees 
reorder their environment by refusing to engage in suggestive selling. Per the negotiated 
order perspective, this arrangement is not permanent. Managers could renegotiate, by 
offering employees rewards or sanctions that may (but not necessarily) convince workers 
to engage in the practice of suggestive selling. This situation is very similar to what 
Morgan (1975) described, except for the fact that I have superimposed negotiated order 
terminology on Leidner’s account of this instance of negotiation.
Leidner, like Reiter, identifies scheduling as an issue of central importance to 
McDonald’s employees. She reports considerable variation in the number of hours 
desired by workers. Although, some workers were content with few hours, others who 
desired more hours “were expected to compete for them, proving themselves deserving 
through conscientious job performance. In practice, a core group of about twenty steady 
workers was sure to get its preferred hours, but cutting back an employee’s hours was a 
standard way the managers showed their displeasure over poor performance or attitude” 
(1991:62). She also reports that management may seek to lengthen or shorten individual 
shifts depending on the number of customers at a given time. Workers tended to be 
successful in obtaining a schedule that fit their needs. “For example, workers who played 
on a high school team could cut down their hours during the sports season, and workers 
who needed to take a particular day off could usually arrange it if they gave sufficient
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notice” (1993:64). Although she does not analyze the process by which workers are able 
to negotiate for desired schedules, she does identify a possible site of negotiation. In a 
process that will be described in chapter four, workers will move from the periphery to 
the “core” to increase their position in negotiations. Despite the fact that Leidner’s 
ethnography does not mention negotiated order, she does show how the social order of 
the restaurant is continually created through structured interaction as the negotiated order 
perspective posits it.
Katherine Newman
Katherine Newman’s (1999), No Shame in My Game, examines impoverished fast
food employees in Harlem. Although the focus o f the work is much wider than
interactions within restaurants, she does present data that is relevant to workplace
negotiations. For instance, she explains how the high unemployment rate in Harlem
serves to depress job wages (1999:63). From the negotiated order perspective one might
conclude that the structural context of the restaurant, in this case the unemployment rate,
impinges on the negotiation context by reducing the power o f employees in negotiations
over wages. Newman also describes the process by which prospective employees
negotiate for a position. She explains how employees seeking employment must carefully
present themselves and use social net works. Newman also relates that managers cannot
accomplish their goals by simply resting on their power to dismiss disobedient
employees. She explains:
Ninety percent of Fernando’s job involves coaxing his 
workforce to abide by the dozens o f rules the firm imposes 
over the preparation of food. There are regulations covering 
virtually every move a worker makes in the production 
process. While he has the authority to discipline workers, 
who fail to cooperate, he has discovered what most
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manages come to know in time: a willing workforce is 
much easier to supervise. And as Fernando points out, you 
cannot keep a constant watch on everybody (1999:179).
This “coaxing” may also be described as Fernando’s negotiation with his employees to
encourage workers to follow the regulations that have been set by the corporation.
Tony Royle
Tony Royle (2000), in Working for McDonald’s in Europe, presents data on fast food 
work. Royle analyzes the relationship between workers and managers in Europe, with 
particular attention given to Germany and Great Britain. He considers how workers 
individually and collectively seek to achieve their personal aims. Royle’s data indicate 
that the negotiated order perspective may be used to study fast food restaurants.
Royle found that there were a number of motivations for employment at McDonald’s. 
Economic marginalization drives many foreign-bom and minority workers to 
McDonald’s in search o f employment. Workers that have failed out of college or an 
apprenticeship may come to McDonald’s for a second chance at a managerial career. 
There are “coasters” whose employment at McDonald’s allows them to ‘tread water’ 
while they decide what they want to do with their life. These workers may be 
uninterested in climbing the corporate ladder. There are workers who have no previous 
experience or who only want part-time employment (Royle 2000). Workers that approach 
the metaphorical bargaining table at McDonald’s for the above reasons may have little in 
the way of resources to negotiate for increased autonomy. By considering the individual 
motivations o f employees, as well as their reasons for choosing to work and continuing to 
work at a given restaurant we can begin to understand how workers go about negotiating
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for their ends. We may be able to delineate the limits o f negotiation. As well as why 
workers may not attempt to negotiate for some goals.
Royle explains how workers may resist managerial directives by creating “short cuts” 
or sabotaging the food. In contrast to the image of the completely controlled worker 
presented by Garson (1988), Royle asserts that workers often ignore orders that are not in 
their interest. He writes, “Although there are rules and tight procedures for everything 
and managers usually working alongside closely monitor the work, workers do 
sometimes find shortcuts...” (2000:60). He relates that these short cuts tend to occur 
when the restaurant is busy and the formally rational plan will not be effective. These 
mavericks were labeled ‘cowboys’ in one UK restaurant. Royle quotes a floor manager, 
“yeah, some o f the lads, the ‘cowboys’ have figured out how to save time on cleaning, 
missing out some of the steps but getting the same results. Or, sometimes, they make 
more burgers than are required by the shift leader on the wrap and call station, so that 
they get a short break” (2000:60). Some workers engaged in acts o f sabotage, such as 
allowing sweat or “nasal fluid” to enter the food, serving food that had fallen on the floor, 
and making food with purposely unwashed hands. Additionally, the food may not be 
prepared according to specifications. He claims that mangers sometimes assume what 
Gouldner called an “indulgency pattern” where managers “turn a blind eye” to deviant 
behavior “providing that customer demand is met” (2000:60). Although he is not using 
these terms, this account represents a negotiation o f the social order. First, management 
establishes a formal rational plan of action. Second, workers adjust this plan to better fit 
their own needs being careful to meet the more important goals of the organization.
Third, management accepts these changes. This negotiation is not final, workers could try
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for too much, go over the line, so to speak, and at which point management might react 
by decreasing autonomy.
In addition to examining the individual negotiations between workers and 
management, Royle also considers group negotiations. While collective bargaining has 
been virtually nonexistent in North America for legal and cultural reasons, European 
nations tend to be more culturally and legally supportive of unions. These structural 
differences allow for greater space for negotiation than is found in the United States. In 
other words, the structural context (in this case laws and norms) affects the negotiation 
context. When McDonald’s first entered the European market, they resisted unionization 
(Royle 2000). For the most, part unions have been unable to muster a desired level of 
influence. However, European workers have had more success in terms of collective 
action than their North American counterparts. Royle explains how a combination of 
cultural values, economic forces, laws, and individual motivations has allowed workers to 
engage in collective bargaining (Royle 2000). Additionally, unions exert a limited 
amount of influence on McDonald’s they have been able to reorder their environment so 
that collective bargaining or negotiation is possibility (Royle 2000). Royle relates that 
unions have improved the pay where they have existed (2000:171). His data show that 
collective bargaining and legal regulations are more efficacious means of achieving the 
goals of fast food workers than individual negotiations.
Negotiations between unequal parties are not likely to yield equitable results. The 
negotiated order perspective does not argue that fast food restaurants are unable to exploit 
workers. Rather, negotiated order demonstrates how organizational interactions are not 
unidirectional. It is significant that employees continue to lose the battle. The social order
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continually arises from interaction and management must continue to see that its goals 
are met. The negotiated order perspective argues that rationalistic oppression is a process 
of keeping the worker down. In this difficult undertaking, one might expect that in 
different negotiation contexts, particularly ones where management has fewer resources, 
(as may be the case in smaller franchises) workers might be more able to negotiate for 
autonomy. Using the negotiated order perspective to understand fast food restaurants 
does not mean that workers will necessarily achieve their goals. Even though Royle is not 
coming from a negotiated order perspective he presents data that suggest that the 
negotiated order perspective may be a useful way to understand how workers may use 
their agency to reorder their environment to their own benefit.
Stuart Tannock
Stuart Tannock (2001) in. Youth at Work, examined the implications of unionization 
in two industries that employ large numbers of young workers, fast food restaurants and 
grocery stores. His data on a unionized Canadian fast food restaurant he names “Fry 
House” are relevant to this study. Tannock’s research is interesting from a negotiated 
order perspective in that he is concemed with how age, culture, and related structural 
issues serve to weaken young workers in negotiations. Moreover, Tannock explains how 
unionized workers are more able to achieve their goals than are non-unionized workers 
(2001).
Tannock contributes to an understanding of the negotiated order of a fast food 
restaurant by noting the substantial differences between workplace environments.
Tannock explains, “The working communities found in the different outlets are not solely 
the creation of workers; they are the result of interactions among workers, managers.
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corporate employers, and local environments- as well as the union local that represents 
these workers” (2001:71). He argues that working environments emerge through 
negotiations. Workers may exert some influence over the labor process through 
negotiation. For example, in some instances, workers will band together to pressure a 
disliked manager to leave (2001:75).
Tannock supports the negotiated order perspective when he concludes:
Sociologists conventionally describe the fast-food industry 
using the framework of routinization. Researchers point to 
routinization, along with close managerial supervision and 
the indoctrination of workers into global corporate cultures, 
as the key element of management control in the fast-food 
workplace. The example o f Glenwood suggests that 
patterns of control and worker-manager relations may be 
more complicated (2001:82)
As we will find in the chapters that follow, employers are not able to simply control the
labor process.
Tannock summarizes the advantages o f unionization at one union. He writes, “Higher 
starting wages, guaranteed raises, employer-provided benefits, and just-cause job 
protection from arbitrary discipline and termination constitute the basic union advantage 
for young Glenwood Fry House workers” (2001:158). Unionization is not an automatic 
panacea; rather its usefulness is borne out in negotiations. Tannock claims, “These 
contrasts in the benefits o f unionism for young stopgap workers in Box Hill and 
Glenwood are not accidental. Local C has made an explicit commitment to minimizing 
differences between junior and senior and younger and older workers in the Fry House 
bargaining unit” (2001:160). Tannock’s research demonstrates the possible affects of 
unionization on the negotiation context o f a fast food restaurant.
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Greta Paules
Greta Paules (1991), an anthropologist, produced an ethnographic account of
waitresses at a chain restaurant located on an interstate highway in New Jersey. As her
title. Dishing it Out: Power and Resistance among Waitresses in a New Jersey'
Restaurant, indicates she is presenting “a study of women who are neither organized nor
upwardly mobile yet actively and effectively strive to protect and enhance their position
at work” (1991:1). Paules begins Dishing it Out with a description of the field. She
discusses the geographic location of the chain restaurant she labels “Route”, on an
interstate highway in an area “undergoing rapid residential and commercial development”
(1991:2). This constitutes an important aspect o f the negotiation context of the restaurant.
Her ethnography is not from the negotiated order perspective, however it is very similar
to what might come from this perspective. For example, Paules asserts:
the Route waitress is not passive. She is engaged in 
ongoing efforts to shield herself from the emotional and 
financial hazards of her occupation and advance her work 
interests. Her strategies of action include... methods of 
manipulating management to ensure her grievances and 
demands will be heeded; and techniques for controlling the 
movement of customers thought the restaurant to maximize 
her tip income (1991:10).
It is also interesting, that some workers are in a better position to negotiate for ends than
others are. She writes, “all waitresses are not equally skilled or aggressive in defending
their interests. Full-time workers are more prone to rebuke impatient or impolite
customers, more fearless in reproaching management, and more adept at manipulating the
tipping system” (1991:11). Although, Paules’ ethnography is dealing with waitresses in a
‘sit down’ restaurant and not fast food, her subjects have a great deal in common with
fast food workers. Paules’ ethnography focuses on low-level food servers in a formally
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rational chain of restaurants. Fast food workers, although structurally less autonomous 
and less skilled face similar issues in a similar environment. Both types of workers may 
attempt to renegotiate a formally rational food service establishment.
In a chapter entitled, “Sources of Autonomy,” she delineates the reasons why
routinization has been limited at Route. She lists inadequate training, the tipping system,
a chaotic environment, high managerial turnover, labor shortages, and the manager's role
as fill-in man as sources o f autonomy for waitresses. For example:
Employees also exploit the manager’s vulnerability as fill- 
in man directly, to increase their control and resist 
interference in their work lives. Between managers and 
senior employees, and especially experienced waitresses, 
virtually all negotiation takes the form of an ultimatum: 
management must comply with the employee’s demands or 
redress her grievance, or she will leave. So often does a 
cook threaten to walk off the line or a waitress threaten to 
walk off the floor, that the act has acquired an almost ritual 
consistency. In the following instance, a waitress who was 
angered that a co-waitress was staying late and potentially 
“tapping into’ her money, ensured that she would be 
favorably “seated,” despite the extra person on the floor, by 
threatening to walk out.
I said, “Innes, I’m in [station] one and two. If one and two 
is not filled at all times from now until three. I’m getting 
my coat, my pocketbook, and I ’m leaving. ” And one and 
two was filled, and I made ninety-five dollars (emphasis in 
original) (quoted in Paules 1991:91).
Here, we see how waitresses are able to take advantage of structural features (labor
pressures, diminished managerial authority) to change the social order to their individual
advantage. Waitresses are able to interpret their situation and militate for increased
autonomy accordingly.
In a chapter entitled, “Up a Crooked Ladder,” Paules builds on her argument that 
diminished managerial prestige and the ability of waitresses to achieve their ends have
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led to a situation where waitresses often eschew the concept of vertical mobility. 
Waitresses see themselves as being in a better position than managers, and consequently 
do not seek out promotions to management. The implication here is that waitresses are 
able to decide for themselves what their course of action should be. Instead of accepting 
the corporation’s notion o f promotion through loyal service, these waitresses are able to 
act in a way that allows them to achieve their ends (Paules 1991).
Paules concludes the ethnography by restating her main point that waitresses are 
capable of negotiating the routinzed restaurant. Waitresses are able to autonomously 
reach their own ends because of their adaptation to structural conditions such as tipping 
system, the shortage o f labor and supplies and the diminished authority of management. 
These workers are actively exploiting structural features in order to gain autonomy. 
Without personal agency, these waitresses would not be able to reorder their social order 
through negotiation. Structure will not create autonomy on its own; workers in highly 
rationalized environments must take advantage of it if  they are to affect their social order. 
Paules is not explicitly using the negotiated order perspective, yet her work demonstrates 
how negotiated order may be used to understand a rationalized food service environment.
Conclusion
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate how the negotiated order perspective could 
be used to inform ethnographic research on fast food workers. Weber, Braverman, and 
Ritzer have theorized that rationalization and scientific management have reduced the 
freedom of employees. One group arguably most constrained by these processes has been 
fast food workers. Ethnographic research by Garson (1988); Reiter (1991); Leidner
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(1993); Newman (1998); Royle (2000); Tannock (2001) has augmented the theoretical 
work on rationalization.
Ethnographies o f routinzed restaurants present a multitude o f data that is relevant to 
this study. Paules (1991) and Royle (2000) show how structural features affected 
workers’ negotiations for increased autonomy. Leidner (1993) and Reiter (1991) 
considered how workers negotiated for autonomy. Individually, they differ somewhat on 
how much autonomy workers have; however, all agree that autonomy is severely limited. 
However, these ethnographies, excluding Paules (1991), focus on one type o f restaurant, 
namely McDonald’s or similarly designed restaurants. They do not adequately consider 
the differentiation o f the fast food industry. Ethnographic research that analyzes fast food 
restaurants from the negotiated order perspective may come to find a great deal of 
diversity in the lived experience of fast food restaurants. Research that makes use of 
participant observation data in different negotiation contexts may find differences 
between. An ethnography written from the negotiated order perspective that takes the 
individual actor’s rational and extrarational motivations and actions into account will be 
able to demonstrate not only how social order is maintained through processes of 
interaction, but also how individuals are free within rationalized environments.
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODS
There are a number of means of collecting empirical data. A researcher must choose 
his or her methodology by examining the research questions, theoretical guidance, and 
the available resources (i.e. time, money, and skills). Fortunately, researchers in the 
planning stages o f a descriptive study usually have a wealth of past research to guide 
their project. This descriptive study is no exception. There are a number of existing 
studies of fast food restaurants as well as analyses from the negotiated order perspective. 
These studies guided my research design. Most studies o f negotiated order and of fast 
food restaurants have used qualitative methodology. Qualitative methodologies are used 
to examine a large number of features of a few cases (Ragin 1994). Qualitative methods 
measure data that is expressed as words and include, field work and observations, 
interviews, qualitative content analysis, and historical analysis (Neuman 2000). After 
considering the existing literature, the particular resources that were available, as well as 
my biographical relationship to the subject matter, I chose to collect data through a 
combination o f auto-ethnographic and observational means.
Negotiated Order, Fast Food, and 
Qualitative Methodology 
The overriding purpose o f this study is to demonstrate how fast food restaurants 
exemplify the maintenance of social order through processes of negotiation. Additionally,
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by using the negotiated order perspective to analyze the employee-employee and 
employee-employer interactions at a fast food restaurant we may understand how and 
under what structural conditions the employees in fast food restaurants may attain their 
personal goals. Although this is the first study to analyze fast food restaurants using the 
negotiated order perspective, there have been several studies from the negotiated order 
perspective and ethnographies of fast food restaurants.
The analysis o f the negotiated order of any milieu requires research methodologies 
that collect in-depth or rich data. To analyze a milieu from the negotiated order 
perspective researchers must obtain descriptions of individuals’ motivations, actions, and 
interpretations. Additionally, a researcher must be aware o f stmctural data such as laws, 
cultural norms, and power. Lastly, the researcher should trace the negotiations over time. 
Qualitative methodology is appropriate to the study of negotiations in a fast food 
restaurant for a number of reasons. First, qualitative methodology allows a researcher to 
analyze the full complexity of a setting (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). Second, Jaber 
Gubrium and James Holstein assert, “Qualitative research also is distinguished by a 
commitment to studying social life in process, as it unfolds” (1991:12). Thirdly, 
qualitative research attempts to reach subjective meanings (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). 
For these reasons, researchers working from the negotiated order perspective employ 
qualitative studies of a small number of cases. Participant observation was used by 
Strauss et al. to study psychiatric hospitals (1963, 1981). Likewise, Tim Faupel and 
Charles Faupel (1987) used fieldwork to analyze an Introduction to Sociology classroom. 
Judith Levy (1982) who studied the interaction between Hospice and medical 
organizations used in-depth interviews and some observations. Raymond Lee (1980)
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employed a historical analysis o f documents and journalistic accounts to study ethnic 
relations in Malaysia. Lawrence Busch (1982) used historical analysis to study the 
negotiations over agricultural research. Researchers may combine a number of methods 
such as observations and interviews. For instance, Albert Meehan (1992) analyzed data 
drawn from fieldwork, interviews, and an analysis of calls made to the police, in his study 
of the negotiated order o f policing.
A number of social scientific studies of fast food restaurants have used qualitative 
data. Royle’s (2000) cross-cultural study o f European McDonald’s restaurants made use 
o f participant observation, questionnaires, and interviews, with the bulk of his data 
coming from interviews. Reiter (1991) explains that after some difficulty gaining entrée 
she worked without pay at a Burger King restaurant in Ontario for a year. Leidner (1993) 
used a combination of observations and structured interviews. Tannock’s (2001) data 
come from observations of two union halls and the public spaces o f restaurants and 
grocery stores and unstructured interviews with workers and union representatives. 
Newman (1998) oversaw a team of researchers who collected data through participant 
observation, interviews, and diaries. Regardless of their specific focus, these descriptive 
or exploratory studies have largely sought to demonstrate the actual working experience 
o f fast food employees, the meanings that this work has, and how the lives of workers 
may be improved. Qualitative methods were used to obtain details that are often left 
untouched by quantitative research (Ragin 1994).
Goals o f the Study
This study is an attempt to contribute to existing theory (Ragin 1994). The negotiated 
order perspective conceived of by Strauss is not a fully developed theory (1978). Strauss
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delineates a number o f possible ways in which researchers may contribute to a theory of
negotiation. He writes:
there are those who while doing substantive research find 
also they can contribute to a general theory o f negotiation.
... they might elaborate sections o f the paradigm that are 
sparse or underdeveloped-as by working through the 
implications of an additional negotiation contextual 
property, by following out in more detail a property already 
noted by me or any other theorist, by focusing intensively 
on different subprocesses and types of negotiation 
interaction, or by treating the same ones more elaborately.
Another conventional and entirely necessary possibility is 
to qualify the formulated theory, since some o f its parts are 
inadequate or inaccurate. (1978:244).
The negotiated order perspective has been used to analyze a number o f different 
milieus. With the exception o f Morgan (1975), few studies from the negotiated order 
perspective analyze highly rationalized social orders. This research attempts to contribute 
to the negotiated order perspective by demonstrating how social order is maintained 
through negotiation between actors who have relatively little autonomy. Moreover, this 
study seeks add to the negotiated order perspective by collecting data that will inform the 
existing sensitizing concepts (such as implicit negotiations or structural context). A 
second, related objective is to describe the negotiations that employees engage in to attain 
their ends. A third objective is to better understand the concept of autonomy as it relates 
to the rationalized work place. A fourth objective o f the study is to the substantive 
understanding of labor in fast food restaurants. While there have been a number of 
ethnographies of fast food restaurants, the diversity of employee experience in fast food 
restaurants has not been fully presented. McDonald’s and Burger King and similarly 
structured restaurants account for the majority of fast food ethnographies. These 
restaurants tend to have a highly differentiated or specialized labor process. However,
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there are thousands o f fast food restaurants that are less differentiated. Likewise, 
corporations operate some fast food restaurants while others are operated by individual 
franchisees. There is considerable diversity for capital required for the purchase and 
operation of a fast food restaurant. I believe that these variables may have an important 
impact on the lived experience o f workers.
Choosing a Data Collection Method 
Studies of negotiated order require the richly detailed data that are generated by 
qualitative methods such as in-depth interviews and participant observation. For a host of 
reasons, I choose to collect my data through observations. Based on Morgan’s (1975) 
study of the negotiated order of a factory, I conjectured that the negotiations that would 
occur in a fast food restaurant would tend to be implicit rather than formally articulated. 
Observing the negotiations that might occur in a highly rationalized environment would 
necessitate careful analysis. Workers may not be entirely cognizant of the negotiations 
that are occurring. Moreover, in order to understand the process of implicit negotiations I 
would have to observe how workers interacted with each other and with management. 
Observational data would allow me to understand what is important to workers and for 
what they would and could negotiate. Reiter explains the advantages of fieldwork over 
interviews, “Sometimes answers do not jibe with what people actually do or think when 
they are in a situation. For example, one worker I knew would insist on how much she 
loved her job at Burger King, but when I saw her at work, she always looked bored and 
unhappy” (1991:76). She also relates, “involvement in the situation allows researchers 
the opportunity to learn something they didn’t know before” (1991:76). By taking 
observations, I was in a position to record what occurred in the setting.
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Data Collection
Danny Jorgensen writes, “selection of a setting is interrelated with problem being 
studied” (1989:40). The objectives of this study and theoretical concerns guided my 
selection of setting. Grinders and Anna’s were selected, in part, through purposive 
sampling, which is used “when a researcher wants to identify particular types of cases for 
in-depth investigation” (Neuman 2000:198). I wanted my observations to come from 
restaurants with reasonably small, undifferentiated crews, which were owned by 
individual franchisees. Firstly, this type of fast food restaurant has not been adequately 
studied. Additionally, I believed that the processes o f negotiation would be easier to 
observe and document in a simple organization, than in a more complex one. Although, I 
infer that the social order of complex restaurants is maintained through negotiation, it will 
be easier to document the processes of negotiation in complex restaurants once more 
simplistic restaurants have been studied.
Convenience and feasibility also played a decisive factor in the selection of sites. 
As Jorgensen explains, “the selection of a setting for participant observation... is 
contingent on (I) whether or not you can obtain access to the setting, (2) the range of 
possible participant roles you might assume, and (3) whether or not this role (or roles) 
will provide sufficient access to phenomena of interest” (1989:41). My biography led me 
to two franchises. Over a period of a number of years, I have been employed by four 
different Grinders franchisees. I have spent over six thousand hours working at six 
different restaurants in very different environments. During my career at Grinders, I was 
a sociology student. I was always interested in trying to gain a scientific understanding of 
my personal experiences. I kept a daily journal o f my experiences during my most recent
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tenure, where I was employed full time for a little under a month, in the summer o f 2001.
I placed entries in it at the end of each shift. This journal provides the bulk of my data 
from Grinders. Given my deep immersion into the world o f Grinders I have access to data 
that may otherwise be unobtainable. This deep immersion is important because, the 
ability to reach the hidden details of implicit negotiations is crucial to the success o f the 
study. Norm Denzin explains how a researcher may achieve this goal, “Because the 
covert act is so difficult to penetrate, I have advocated the use of introspective- 
investigator accounts o f the self in process. Such accounts provide the basic source of 
data on the covert features of the public act” (1978:15).
As an insider, I have been able to understand processes o f negotiation that may have 
remained hidden to an outsider. My decision to is not unorthodox. Jorgensen writes, “the 
researcher already may be a participant before deciding formally to conduct research in 
the setting” (1989:41). Additionally, David Hayano relates “some auto-ethnographers 
worked at various jobs before or even during their careers as professional social 
scientists, and later analyzed their experiences” (1979:100).
Observing a second franchise deepened my perspective and increased the 
generalizability o f the study. Obtaining access to a particular milieu can be very 
problematic. A number o f researchers who have studied fast food restaurants have 
reported difficulty in gaining entrée (Leidner 1993; Reiter 1991; Royle 2000).
Fortunately, I am acquainted with a franchisee who allowed me to be a semi-employee at 
his fast food restaurant named Anna’s. Fred allowed me to perform job tasks such as 
cleaning and some food preparation. I observed Anna’s on twelve different occasions for
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over eighty hours, in the fall o f2001. The employees knew that I was conducting 
research, so I was able to ask them questions.
Ethnographers usually do not have the ability to state with any degree o f statistical
accuracy their confidence in the generalizability of their sample. Denzin explains.
The naturalistic observer seldom can specify with precise 
detail the universe o f interactive relationships he wishes to 
generalize to. He takes several approaches to the problem.
He may... locate himself in a situation where the joint act 
occurs and argue that his sample is dravm from the 
behaviors of all people who pass through this situation...”
(1978:19).
The two restaurants represent a venue where one is able to observe what may occur in a 
fast food restaurant. While, I maintain that there is a tremendous diversity in the lived 
experience o f fast food employees, there are limits on that diversity. Franchised fast food 
restaurants are based on a rationalized plan. A single restaurant in a franchise will share a 
similar labor process, similar structuring o f hierarchy, and similar equipment with all 
other restaurants within the franchise. In as much as every Grinders restaurant where I 
have been employed is distinct in some ways there are many commonalties. For instance, 
franchisees instruct their employees to slice the rolls in the same way. Most employees 
wear roughly equivalent uniforms within the franchise. Each restaurant owned the same 
brand of tomato sheer. By definition, there are important similarities in fast food 
restaurants of the same chain. Consequently, most franchised fast food restaurants will 
share some common experiences. In addition to arguing that all fast food restaurants 
(regardless o f chain) share some common features, it is important to note the 
“theoretically relevant features” of the restaurants that I observed (Denzin 1978b: 19). For 
instance, the restaurants that I observed are located in large cities, they are owned by a
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husband and wife; they have relatively small crews (under tw^enty employees). Relevant 
theoretical features are identified throughout the analysis.
Difficulties and Limitations 
Each type o f methodology carries with it certain intrinsic limitations. Auto­
ethnography and participant observation are no exception. There is some debate over the 
degree to which qualitative social scientists should be aware o f how their personal 
biography impinges on their interpretations (Gubrium and Holstein 1997). My 
biographical relationship to the subject is significant. Whatever biases arose from the 
closeness o f biography to the setting at Grinders should be off set by my distance from 
the setting at Anna’s. Conversely, whatever relevant data I was unable to uncover at 
Anna’s due to my outsider status was corrected by my insider status at Grinders. In short, 
by using two types of observational data I surmise that the problems associated with 
either type of observation will be off set. Moreover, it should be noted that this work is 
not an exercise in praxis. I did not begin with the intention of improving the lives of 
workers. This study is simply a negotiated order analysis of simple fast food restaurants. 
Therefore, feelings of sympathy or camaraderie will have little influence on my findings 
or conclusions.
There is also some difficulty in the actual recording of observations at fast food 
restaurants (Reiter 1991; Royle 2000). It is often difficult to take notes in hectic 
environments. I corrected for this problem by recording my observations shortly after 
leaving the field. While I cannot attest to the absolute veracity o f quotations and 
descriptions, in each case they are very close to what actually occurred, any distortions 
are most likely insignificant.
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Ethical Issues
There are a number o f ethical issues that arise when observing human subjects. These 
non-mutually exclusive issues include, the need to protect subjects from legal, physical, 
and emotional harm; the need to preserve the anonymity or confidentiality of the 
subjects; to obtain informed consent; and to not misrepresent oneself in the field 
(Neuman 2000). These ethical issues are based on not causing harm to the people who 
provide scientists with data. The non-controversial nature of this study and the concerted 
effort to maintain confidentiality have protected my subjects from any reasonable 
possibility of harm. Observations were taken at Anna’s after receiving approval from the 
UNLV Social/Behavioral Institutional Review Board on October 31, 2001. After 
submitting my request to observe Anna’s I submitted a revision to my original protocol 
requesting permission to analyze my biographical data. Many identifying characteristics 
have been altered or suppressed. For instance, the names of the restaurant, employees, 
and franchisees have been changed. It is sincerely believed that none of the data 
presented here are o f a seriously controversial or damaging nature. In many parts, the 
data relate to my own personal experience as an employee at a fast food restaurant. As 
mentioned above, working at Grinders is a substantial aspect of my biography. Criticisms 
of a privileged ethnographer obtaining data from a margninalized group are not relevant 
here.
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CHAPTER 4
AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEGOTIATED 
ORDER OF A FAST FOOD 
RESTAURANT
In this chapter, I will apply the negotiated order perspective to fast food restaurants. 
While the social order o f the fast food industry is subject to negotiation at many levels 
and amongst a myriad of different actors, this analysis will focus on the negotiations 
between coworkers and franchisees. I will begin by introducing the site of the 
negotiation, including the general features o f each restaurant and the specific actors. The 
chapter will then move to discuss the cast o f a typical fast food restaurant and what their 
individual motivations and strategies may be. Next, the essential aspects of negotiations 
will be considered including strategies, the negotiation context, structural context, and 
temporal aspects. The chapter concludes with an analysis o f the specific issues that were 
negotiated in the restaurants. The issues are separated into two types, external (including 
wages, scheduling, and security) and internal (including job task assignment and the 
definition o f deviance). While the point of view of the franchisees will be taken into 
account, this analysis focuses on the perspective of individual workers.
A Tale o f Two Franchises 
This research is largely based on my personal experiences and observations at two 
nationally franchised fast food restaurants. Both franchises are less uniform than 
McDonald’s (Jackie and Sculle 1999). In both locations the franchisor seemed to exercise
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less control than what Royle described at McDonald’s (2000). Grinders specializes in 
long sandwiches, commonly referred to as submarines, heroes, hoagies, or in this case 
grinders. Anna’s specializes in ice cream, but also presents a menu of hamburgers, 
hotdogs, fried chicken, and french fries. Both Grinders and Anna’s are less differentiated 
than the McDonald’s or Burger King restaurants that have been studied by other 
researchers (Reiter 1991; Leidner 1993; Royle 2000). The relatively simple division of 
labor allows for a more clear portrayal of the negotiation of social order. Although these 
restaurants are less complex than some fast food franchises, they still operate according 
to a uniformly rational model. By outlining the salient features of the structural and 
negotiation contexts, we can achieve a sense o f how the social order of the fast food 
restaurant is achieved through cooperation amidst competition. The following will 
describe the setting, and the cast, of each location. Afterwards, I will present a more 
general description o f the types of actors, their motivations, abilities, and their position 
vis-à-vis other actors.
Grinders
The location where much of my auto-ethnographic data is based is a mature 
restaurant in a commercial center o f a large northeastern city. The restaurant is located in 
a freestanding building within walking distance o f a number of hotels, businesses, and 
other entities with a high number of employees. Located in a dense commercial location 
it did not have a drive through window. The restaurant was usually busy between 11:00 
AM and 2:30 PM on weekdays. After lunch (about 2:30 PM) and weekends were 
relatively slow. However, conventioneers at the nearby hotels would sporadically 
supplement the restaurants business.
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At Grinders, customers ordered from an employee who would fix the sandwich or 
salad. All o f the materials for sandwich construction were located in front o f the 
employee. Who would prepare the order and either receive payment or pass the wrapped 
item to the person at the register. There are three principle job tasks; food preparation 
(such as slicing vegetables, mixing tuna fish and mayonnaise, etc.), cleaning, and 
customer service (constructing sandwiches, and operating the cash register). During busy 
periods there would be four or five workers continually taking customer orders while 
another employee or more likely James (the franchisee) or Kiran (James’ wife and the 
manager) stayed on the cash register. The workers labored under confined conditions. 
Frequently, there were too many or too few well-trained employees working during the 
busy periods. Whenever the crew was short staffed, the employees who were present 
would attempt to compensate for their missing compatriots. Whenever too many people 
were working at one time, it would be difficult for the employees to maneuver around 
each other. During busy lunches, the line o f customers would stretch to the entrance. 
Employees would struggle to prepare food items around their coworkers and to isolate 
the voice o f their individual customer from the cacophony of voices. When James was 
present, he would usually operate the cash register; otherwise, Kiran would receive 
payment. When business was slow, the same employee who filled the customer’s order 
would take money from the customer.
The crew was ethnically and racially diverse; it consisted of two franchisees, three 
core employees, and a fluid stock of periphery, less dependable characters. A core 
member may be defined as one who is capable of performing most of the routine tasks 
and has worked for a relatively long amount o f time. An indication of core status might
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be if an employee is asked to help train new employees. The core members included two 
twenty-year old Puerto Rican college students named Juanita and Maria; an eighteen-year 
old high school student o f mixed racial background named Shawn; an Indian thirty 
something named James who owned the restaurant and his wife Kiran who managed the 
restaurant. Shawn, Maria, and Juanita were able to do almost all o f the tasks that were 
required to run the restaurant. Due to their centrality, they held a distinct position in 
negotiations. The restaurant would be far less profitable for James and Kiran were it not 
for the presence of the core workers. Moreover, the core workers relieved Kiran and 
James of a great deal of the worry over the mundane details of restaurant management.
An essential feature of core employee status is that core employees effectively exercise 
authority over peripheral employees in the absence of the franchisee. However, for all 
their competence, this particular restaurant simply could not function effectively on the 
labors of the core figures alone. A constantly changing pool of periphery employees 
contributed to the restaurant. During my month long tenure (including me) four people 
resigned, (one of whom Kiran claims that she was about to fire), and one was fired (the 
worker claimed that she was about to resign). In the same time period four people were 
hired. The periphery employees could be divided into two groups, the competent, and the 
incompetent. Of course, this is a sliding scale; employees can be relatively useful or 
useless (some employees were so incompetent that they became a physical obstacle) to 
their co-workers. A competent peripheral employee may be peripheral due to part-time 
status or having only been employed for a brief period of time (three employees at 
Grinders fit this description). An incompetent peripheral employee is simply one who for 
whatever reason is of little usefulness to coworkers or management. An actor’s status as a
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core or periphery worker has an important affect on the workers position in the ongoing 
negotiations.
A crew may change over time. According to one core employee, James had originally 
run the restaurant with enthusiasm, but over the years, he came to be less and less 
concemed with the daily operation o f this location. Perhaps, his other Grinder restaurant 
was a distraction or maybe he was slowly burning out. Whatever the cause, James did not 
present himself as someone who identified with his franchise. I never witnessed even a 
hint of the corporate ideology that has been reported by other ethnographers (Reiter 
1991). There was some concern that he might sell the restaurant. The Grinders restaurant 
was well worn. I presume the equipment was purchased when James first bought the 
restaurant was fairly beaten up. The walk in freezer appeared to be in constant danger of 
failure. The food disposal broke down periodically. The schedule was often posted a few 
days late or not at all. We were usually out of some menu items. James’ lack of 
enthusiasm was of central importance to the negotiations. The employees who sought to 
negotiate implicitly or explicitly for there own benefit from their own position interpreted 
his position. The core employees tended to be somewhat extroverted and seemed to feel 
quite comfortable in expressing their concerns. In fact, the extroverted behavior extended 
into other spheres o f behavior that had nothing to do with jockeying for preferable job 
tasks or scheduling. Shawn would loudly announce the arrival of his birthday or his 
displeasure with a given shift. Maria and Shawn might have a conversation about their 
home lives. As the employees felt comfortable expressing themselves, they often made 
their motivations known as easily as any other aspect o f their life that they felt sharing 
with the group. This ease with their surroundings influenced the pursuit of their interests.
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Anna’s
The Anna’s restaurant is located on the comer o f an intersection in a freestanding 
building complete with a sizable parking lot and drive through window. The restaurant 
has a large dining area, an area for the preparation o f desert food that is within customer’s 
view and a grill and deep fryer in the kitchen. Additionally, there is a break room and 
storage area. The restaurant is located near a residential area in a large city. Anna’s 
business is largely comprised of the families in the surrounding residential area. Given 
the restaurant’s heavy emphasis on traditional summertime desserts, the weather is an 
important component o f the structural context o f the social order. The volume of business 
or rather the franchisee’s interpretation of the volume of business is directly related to the 
terms of negotiation. The observations were made during the off-season. The crew had 
already been reduced to Fred, the franchisee; his wife, Cary; two core employees, Sandra 
and Dianne; and two part-time workers named John and Mike.
While Grinders seemed to be a portrait of constant strife and fluidity, Anna’s was far 
more static. The schedule did not change substantially from week to week. The crew was 
stable; there was no turnover during my observations. Fred, who unlike James, was not 
divided between two locations was able to devote his full attention to the maintenance of 
the restaurant. His near constant presence significantly reduced the autonomy of the 
employees. Sandra and Dianne were so overwhelmingly competent that they did not have 
any difficulty serving the customers according to the established routine. The literature 
on routinzed labor tends to focus on large operations that have a highly differentiated 
labor force. This restaurant, which during the busy season may become highly 
differentiated, was operating with a reduced crew. During the occasional busy period, a
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single employee may have to perform the work of two or three employees. This was 
possible because the franchisee and the workers had honed their skills to the point where 
they could seamlessly work with each other. As with any fast food restaurant, the labor 
process at Anna's is highly routinzed. There is a very specific procedure for each menu 
item. Large parties would arrive; one worker would take the order while the other would 
prepare it. One worker would go to the kitchen to grill or fry the dinner foods while the 
other would prepare the dessert items. The worker who finished first would package the 
food. The clockwork operations stood in stark contrast to the near chaos of Grinders.
The Cast
Individuals have their own motivations for entering the restaurant. These motivations 
may be similar or disparate. Likewise, actors may be in conflict or in allegiance with each 
another. Confusing the situation is that the same two individuals who are working 
together for one end may be conflict over another. Two employees who are cooperating 
to close the restaurant on time may be in conflict over who will receive a certain day off. 
The individuals are existential selves, each with their own motivations that may include 
rational and extra-rational desires. These desires may shift and change with the situation. 
A number of structural factors such as regulations, the weather, the economy, and cultural 
values affect the milieu. The motivations, emotions, and social skills of the actors as well 
as their interpretation of the structural factors influence the negotiation context. The 
franchisee and the employees form the core of the social order. In addition to the 
franchisee and the employees, there is an endless succession o f competitors, property 
owners, suppliers, regulatory agents, customers, and the franchisee and its 
representatives, who each make their presence felt as they bargain for their interests.
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The Franchisee
The franchisee stands at the center of negotiations in the social order o f the fast 
food restaurant. The franchisee must interact, directly or indirectly, with regulatory 
agencies, property owners, competitors, customers, employees, and the franchisor. If the 
franchisee is to be successful then all o f the proceeding actors (with the exception o f the 
competition) must be satisfied. Ultimately, all decisions and all actions are her or his 
responsibility and she or he retains immediate authority over what transpires. Corporate 
mandates can be ignored, irate customers can be refused service, insubordinate 
employees can be dismissed, and the board o f health can be ignored. However, if  a 
franchisee wants to keep her or his franchise, retain customers, maintain a crew, and 
avoid legal sanction, the franchisee must pacify all o f the relevant actors. In the unstable 
environment of the restaurant, customers and employees must feel that they are receiving 
enough from the interaction for them to remain in the interaction. The restaurant depends 
on some actors individually (such as the franchisor or the board of health) or collectively 
(in the case of customers or employees).
In order to achieve her or his goals, a franchisee must interpret the demands of the 
people with whom she interacts. Myriad questions confront franchisees. What will a 
particular health inspector allow? How trustworthy are the employees? How competent 
are they to run the restaurant without supervision? How closely should the company line 
on prices, formulas, and decor be followed? How much will customers pay for a small 
order of french fries? How long will they wait for a milk shake? How much meat do they 
expect on their submarine sandwich? As the franchisee interprets the various demands
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and predicts the most probable, actions o f the individuals in question, the franchisee must 
then attempt to minimally satisfy all parties concerned.
The Employees
Collectively, the employees are an integral component of the restaurant. With the 
possible exception o f restaurants that have very few customers, a franchisee cannot exist 
without help. The franchisee must interpret what employees will and will not do. A 
franchisee cannot make claims on employees that are out o f line with the majority of their 
expectations. Individually, however, a single employee may be utterly replaceable. Given 
the virtual absence of unions in fast food restaurants in the United States, fast food 
employees are an atomized group. Fast food employees are just as likely to be in conflict 
with each other as they are to be in conflict with management. The interchangeability, 
which ostensibly weakens fast food workers, might also increase their power. In as much 
as they can be replaced easily, frequently, they may replace one fast food job with 
another. Since the job offers an employee little in the way of formal training or 
recognized skills, a worker who has been successful in obtaining one fast food job can 
usually expect to be capable of gaining another. The significance of this fact is that 
depending on the structural context (the unemployment rate, or the number o f low skill 
jobs) a franchisee may have to compete with other employers. If a franchisee consistently 
offers his employees less in the way o f wages or scheduling flexibility than do other 
employers in the immediate surroundings, the franchisee may find her or his restaurant 
suffering from a shortage of labor. Conversely, if there are few options for alternative 
employment, an employer may be able to make greater claims on his or her employees.
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Like franchisees, fast food employees must assess the structural and the negotiation 
context if he or she is to be triumphant. Employees interpret the franchisee’s desires, his 
or her value to the franchisee, the various biases and proclivities o f the employer, and 
what can and cannot be negotiated with the franchisee. A franchisee that does not allow 
employees to use the telephone may allow them to have visitors. A core employee may 
be allowed to use the telephone while a peripheral employee may not.
As mentioned above, employees negotiate vertically (with management) and 
horizontally (with co-workers). There are a number of issues where co-workers will be in 
direct or indirect involvement with each other. For instance, in some restaurants, co­
workers may have to negotiate the assignment of job tasks. Workers may be left to decide 
who will prepare vegetables, wait on customers, or clean the toilets. Scheduling issues, in 
terms of who gets to work when and who gets the most hours may bring workers into 
direct conflict or cooperation. Co-worker negotiation is exemplified by the common 
practices o f “switching schedules” or having another worker “cover” for one who wishes 
to take a given day off. The agreement to do this is invariably worked out through some 
form of explicit or implicit negotiation. For instance, many years ago, one August 
evening, some friends of mine came in to visit me while I was working. They were going 
to see a movie in a nearby theatre. It was the end of the summer; I was tired of working, 
and anticipating the arrival o f a substantial student loan check. In short, I really wanted to 
‘blow o ff  work and go to the movie. I could not afford to simply quit, nor would I walk 
out on an employer who I personally liked. I was there with two co-workers, one who 
was scheduled to work until 11:00 PM; the other was due to leave five minutes ago. 
Neither had been trained to close the restaurant. That was my job. I could not trust the
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one scheduled to work until 11:00 PM to manage the restaurant alone. My only hope was 
to convince the worker who was about to leave to cover the shift for me. I asked him if he 
would like to increase his hours. He informed me that he would not. I offered to pay him 
ten dollars on top of the extra three hours wages that he would earn while I was at the 
movie. Deal. This is a simple example of explicit co-worker negotiation. Notice that the 
features of the negotiation context such as the role of emotions and personal ties (not 
wanting to cause harm to my employer) trust (not trusting to leave my co-worker alone). 
Structural features (the presence o f financial aid) also impinged on the negotiation 
context.
Successful employees are able to read the structural context and discern how it might 
affect the negotiation context. An employee who knows that there are a number of other 
similar jobs in the immediate vicinity may be able to claim more for herself than an 
employee working in an area plagued with a dearth of similar jobs. An employee must 
also be able to interpret the negotiation context. For instance, the emotions that are a part 
of any social environment may affect the negotiations at any given time. An employee 
who is in search of a raise or increased hours must interpret the optimal time to initiate 
negotiations with the franchisee.
The Significant Extras 
In addition to the employees and employers, there are a number of other actors who 
take their part in the ongoing negotiations of the social order. Customers, franchisors, 
competitors, and regulatory agents (health inspectors) each pursuing different interests 
enter the negotiations. They are considered extras here because on any given day they 
may not actually negotiate directly or individually with either the franchisor or the
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employees. First, there are the customers. Without enough customers, a restaurant will 
not be economically viable. While the customers, as a whole, drastically influence the 
social order, an individual customer has relatively little affect on the ongoing 
negotiations. If a single customer does not agree with the price a hamburger, the quality 
of the patty, or the length of wait, that single customer may negotiate ‘with his feet’ and 
never be missed. However, customers will have to be reckoned with if they all take a 
similar stance to an action by a franchisee or franchisor. Customers form a negotiating 
block in the ongoing incremental negotiations. In order to meet their goals, the franchisee 
and the franchisor attempt to interpret and meet the customer’s expectations. Their 
recognition o f customer demands significantly influences the negotiations. Issues that can 
and cannot be bargained for often depend on what employers’ believe customers expect.
The health inspector affects the social order. On a typical day, the health inspector is 
unlikely to be directly involved with the restaurant. However, this official’s judgement 
may have dire consequences for the franchisee and employees alike. If the health 
inspector finds regulations being ignored, the inspector may sanction the franchisee. This 
is a threat that Fred and Kiran, two franchisees thousands o f miles apart, took very 
seriously. It can be assumed that most restaurateurs feel an ethical obligation to maintain 
sanitary conditions, but the government, in the person of the health inspector decides 
precisely what the standards will be. A single franchisee has little power in relation to the 
health inspector. I witnessed little in the way o f negotiation between health inspectors and 
franchisees. The franchisees had nothing to offer health inspectors save their compliance 
to the impersonal social order. The impersonal social order that is enforced by the health 
inspector is itself a matter of explicit negotiation. Much like the governmental regulations
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of the liquor industry, at some level, the laws that regulate restaurants, (or the laws that 
regulate the regulators) must be negotiated (Denzin 1977, 1978a). For instance, lobbyists 
working on behalf o f the restaurant industry may influence the social order.
Like the health inspector, the franchisor sets the terms of the specific interaction. 
Many franchisees seek to ensure a level o f uniformity by having periodic inspections of 
the franchisee. Interactions between franchisees and franchisors are highly variable. In 
some instances, franchisors maintain a great deal o f control over franchisees; in other 
cases franchisees operate with relative autonomy. The terms of the interaction are set at 
the time of the contract signing. Potential franchisees have the option of selecting from a 
large pool o f franchisees in order to find the arrangement that best suits his or her desires. 
The two franchisees under consideration here maintained a relatively high degree of 
autonomy from the franchisor. The corporation periodically inspected both restaurants, 
but these inspections did not seem to carry the weight of the health inspections. While the 
authority o f the health inspector clearly weighed on the minds of Kiran and Fred neither 
franchisee expressed concern for the views of the franchisor. This lack of concern may 
partially be explained by the fact that many of the interests of the franchisee and the 
franchisor coincide. Both franchisee and franchisor want sales to be high. In addition to 
the name and the product, the franchisee purchased the formula for operation, it is only 
logical that the franchisee makes use o f that formula, and with negligible exception they 
did. However, there are instances when the motives of franchisor’s and franchisees are in 
conflict (Royle 2000; Schlosser 2001).
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Aspects of Negotiations 
To examine the issues that may be negotiated in a franchised fast food restaurant, we 
must understand some of the essential features o f negotiation. First, negotiations occur 
between actors who are attempting to satisfy varying desires. Each actor comes to the 
negotiations with different motivations. Actors with similar goals may attempt to achieve 
their goals through different means. We must be mindful of the negotiation context that 
surrounds the interactions. Unlike rational choice models of negotiation, this analysis is 
mindful o f the role that emotions play in influencing the unfolding negotiations.
Likewise, we cannot lose our awareness o f the structural context that contains the 
negotiation context. Finally, the negotiated order perspective maintains that the 
negotiations over social order are never final, rather social order is fluid and must be 
continually renegotiated with changes in the structural and negotiation contexts, as well 
as when actor’s motivations change or when different individuals enter a milieu (Strauss 
197%L
The Structural and Negotiation Contexts 
The structural context of negotiations refers to the structural features that affect 
negotiations (Strauss 1978). Structure does not strictly determine the outcome of 
negotiations. However, an actor’s interpretation o f the social structural, coupled with the 
actor’s interpretation of the other actor’s interpretation of the social structure wields a 
great influence on the negotiations. The structural context of a restaurant includes but is 
certainly not limited to the size of the restaurant, the volume o f business, the weather, 
cultural beliefs (racism, consumerism, sexism, etc.), the presence of competitors, the 
laws, the formal organization of restaurant, and so forth. In order to consider the
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negotiations of any milieu we must understand how actors interpret the relevant structural 
features. The negotiation context refers to all things that directly affect the negotiation of 
a social order (Strauss 1978). The negotiation context includes the structural features and 
the individuals’ motivations, values, strategies, and emotions.
Emotions
Emotions play a large role in the ongoing negotiations. Employees and franchisees 
often work at a frantic pace, for long hours, in tight quarters near hot fryers, grills, and 
ovens. In restaurants that are not highly differentiated (like Grinders and Anna’s) the 
labor process may combine the repetition of an assembly line, with the degradation and 
exasperation of customer service work, and the sometimes-nauseating characteristics of 
janitorial work. One can imagine how a fast food restaurant might become an emotionally 
charged environment. Two employees may find that they would like to fill the same 
niche in the ecosystem. A worker’s compensation dispute can boil beneath the façade of 
an ostensibly harmonious worker-employee relationship. As the actors cooperate and 
compete with each other, intense feelings of admiration, loyalty, and resentment may 
develop. These emotions are a continually varying element that must be interpreted and 
adjusted to if the actors are to cooperate with each other. Emotional issues have a drastic 
effect on how people interact with each other. There are times to negotiate and there are 
times to avoid interaction. For instance, Shawn, a day after an argument about the 
schedule with James was incredibly reluctant to make work-related suggestions to his 
employer. Conversely, Shawn wisely pressed James for a raise while the four of us were 
celebrating the most profitable day o f the year. A symbiotic maintenance o f the social 
order requires sensitivity to the emotions of one’s fellow members in an emotionally
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charged environment. Affecting the emotional context is the conflation of primary and 
secondary relationships.
In many ways, fast food restaurants are the epitome of the process of rationalization 
described by Weber. These restaurants have deskilled the labor process to a point where 
employees are said to have become interchangeable (Reiter 1991). Impersonality is one 
of the defining marks of rationalization in general and fast food restaurants in particular. 
However, impersonality is not a factor at all fast food restaurants. Despite rationalization, 
high turnovers rates, comparatively low pay, competition and atomization, market 
relations have not completely erased moral relations. Both employees (usually core 
employees) and the franchisee often come to share a history and an interpersonal 
understanding that defies the popular notion that impersonal relations mark fast food 
employment. Some workers become friends. A franchisee might come to empathize with 
long-term employees. Workers do not necessarily allow their feelings of camaraderie or 
intimacy to occlude their personal desires. To the contrary I have yet to see a conflation 
of primary and secondary relationships result in either a worker or an employee seriously 
departing from their own position simply because they may “like” or “care for” another 
person in the restaurant. One of the features of negotiations in a simple franchised fast 
food restaurant is that individuals often pursue their own personal interests in a 
contentious or competitive fashion, with people they intimately understand. There are a 
number of different strategies that actor’s may employ in their negotiations.
Strategies of Negotiation 
Two individuals who are in structurally similar positions may attempt to achieve 
widely divergent goals. One employee may wish to increase his autonomy to improve his
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
76
individual working conditions. Another may be primarily motivated to earn as much
money as possible. The specific strategies o f the employees and the franchisee depend on
their individual interpretations o f  the negotiation context. David Altheide explains.
The crucial element in negotiating order, however is the 
essential relationship between an actor’s situational 
definition and the social world within which it emerges.
The context does not automatically direct or lead actors to 
one course o f action rather than to another; there always is 
more than one possible course of action (emphasis in 
original 1988:343).
If an actor is going to be successful in getting what he or she wants from the social order, 
he or she may calculate his or her actions. Franchisees and employees interpret the 
negotiation context. Sometimes actors will articulate their desires and what they are 
willing to give in return. Other times, actors will choose to engage in implicit 
negotiations. The decision depends, in part, on the personal proclivities o f the individual. 
Some people prefer explicit negotiations, while others choose to negotiate implicitly 
through action. The next section will examine some strategies that franchisees employ in 
their negotiations with their employees. Employee strategies will be considered in the 
section describing the typology of negotiated issues.
Franchisee Strategies for Negotiating 
with Employees
A single franchisee, operating one or two restaurants may not have access to the 
human resource specialists. While the Burger Kings and McDonald’s of the industry can 
invest a great deal of resources to placate employees, this task takes on a different 
meaning for individual franchisees. Reiter describes how Burger King uses an industrial 
psychology to encourage their employees to work hard for little pay (1991). Eric
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Schlosser reports that McDonald’s uses transactional analysis to motivate employees 
without offering material rewards. Schlosser relates, “that managers are trained in a 
technique called “stroking,” wherein managers give “deliberate praise, and recognition 
that many teenagers don’t get at home. Stroking can make a worker feel that his or her 
contribution is sincerely valued. And it’s much less expensive than raising wages or 
paying overtime” (2001:74). Depending on the individual proclivities of the franchisee 
can use a sort of layman’s human relations theory o f management may be used to smooth 
over the effects of the scientific management on the psyches of employees.
Both Fred and James are willing to negotiate with increase the wages of core 
employees that they wish to retain. Fred offered overtime to his core employees and I 
witnessed James give an hourly raise to a core employee. Unlike some of the managers at 
some corporate fast food restaurants, the franchisees at Anna’s and Grinders maintain 
enough autonomy from the franchisor to decide how and if they want to negotiate with 
industrial psychology or human relations theory to supplement the scientific management 
intrinsic to the fast food restaurant. This decision depends largely on the franchisee. I 
never witnessed Fred attempt to use any technique that resembled stroking. James, 
however, did not appear to share Fred’s candor. This is not to say that James is dishonest, 
but rather, James (who is rumored to have a BA in psychology) is willing to use the 
emotionality o f the negotiation context to his advantage.
The following situations exemplify how James maintained the social order, in part by 
knowing when to mollify an angry employee. Saturdays at Grinders are supposed to be 
easy days. This expectation is a part of the negotiation context. This section of the city is 
very quiet on the weekends. Kiran and James react to the structural context by reducing
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the number o f crew over the weekend. One Saturday I was scheduled to work from open 
to close with Juanita and Maria. It was supposed to be an easy day. I expected to have 
two highly competent co-workers to help me serve few customers. Unfortunately, there 
was a convention and my highly competent co-workers were sick and at home. The 
conventioneers, stationed in a hotel near the restaurant had few culinary options over the 
weekend when many restaurants were closed. At 11:00 AM, 1 called James and Kiran 
requesting help. James claimed that he would be at the restaurant at 11:30 AM. The 
conventioneers continued to enter the restaurant. I processed the customers successfully, 
but the restaurant looked as if 1 had been playing with hand grenades. Discarded wax 
paper covered the floor. The dining area needed to be bused. The sink was overflowing 
with dishes. James and Kiran kept failing to show up. My anger deepened steadily. By 
12:30 PM, James and Kiran finally appeared. Kiran immediately set to work. James 
assessed the situation. Unfortunately, the rush had subsided, making it seem as though 1 
had exaggerated the number of customers that 1 had served. He did not chide me for not 
working hard enough or for being sloppy. Instead, he decided to maintain the social order 
by stating, “You did well for your first time alone.” He then read the register tape and 
realized that 1 had been busy. James interpreted the situation, realized that 1 might be 
somewhat angry about having had to work so hard without assistance. He modified his 
original statement. “You did tremendous!” His articulated recognition worked to diffuse 
my frustration. By interpreting the negotiation context, he preserved the social order by 
encouraging me to remain at the restaurant.
Another example of a franchisee being mindful of the emotions in the negotiation 
context occurred when James wanted to alter the established work schedule. 1 had been
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working for ten days in a row with out a day off. While this would not seem out of the 
ordinary in some negotiation contexts, at this Grinders restaurant, a feature o f the 
negotiation context was that employees expected to receive regular time off. I was greatly 
looking forward to next four days. It was Thursday and I was not scheduled to work 
Friday, Saturday, or Tuesday. The negotiation context had changed in that some workers 
were continually calling off. James interpreted the change in the negotiation context and 
decided that he needed to increase the hours of another worker to make up for the 
potentially tmant workers. James decided that 1 should work some extra shifts. 1 too had 
interpreted not just the absence of workers in the negotiation context, but also that James 
might ask me to sacrifice my time off, my excitement dissolved into trepidation as the 
shift wore on. James interpreted my emotional state when he approached me toward the 
end of my shift.
James: Tomorrow you get a day off. You deserve it. What, is it your first in ...
Eric: Three weeks.
James: Five years.
[Restrained chuckles all around]
He then proceeded to tell me that 1 would have to work on Saturday and for a half 
shift on Tuesday. 1 could have protested. However, 1 did not want to be fired. Moreover, 
it was exceedingly difficult to argue with a boss who was demonstrably sympathetic to 
my plight. Lastly, emotionally, it was easier to accept an easy Saturday shift because 1 
was relieved about not being asked to work for an eleventh day in a row. James was 
successful in negotiating for his desires, in that he was able to fix the deficiency in the 
schedule, without having an employee resign (an ever-present danger). James was
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successful, in part because he correctly read the emotional elements o f the negotiation 
context and compensated for this in his negotiation strategy. This interaction, as we will 
see later, represents a negotiation in that I could very well have refused. Later I will relate 
a similar instance where the employee decided not to accept an undesired shift.
The Temporal Aspects of Negotiation 
The analysis of the negotiated order o f fast food restaurants is based on the notion 
that social order is continually negotiated. Issues that have been negotiated at one time 
will most likely be renegotiated as the structural and negotiation contexts change. A 
change in the unemployment rate, the actors, the laws, cultural beliefs, emotions and so 
forth may present an opportunity or call for a renegotiation of specific issues. Since social 
order is created through interaction, the social order may change with each set of 
negotiations. Employees who collaborate at one time may not cooperate in the future. A 
tense employee-employer relationship may improve. Likewise, an amiable employee- 
employer relationship may sour over time. Negotiations are usually conducted in the 
shadow of previous negotiations. For instance, the employees at Grinders warned me 
about the dangers o f being too flexible in terms of scheduling. One day after I had agreed 
to come in off o f the schedule one employee warned, “Now that you covered, he’ll 
always expect you to .. .[it will be like] you need the day off, see Eric...” Oftentimes 
issues are negotiated periodically, with the conclusion of the negotiation holding until the 
next time the issue comes up. For example, an employee may explicitly negotiate for a 
higher wage. The negotiations presented below will illustrate how the social order 
changes with the ongoing negotiations.
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The Negotiations
Within the social order o f the restaurant there are innumerable points that most be 
compromised upon, from the schedule to the assignment of job tasks to the definition of 
deviance. This section will focus on employee-employer and employee-employee 
negotiations. There are two main types of issues that may be negotiated, those that are 
external (i.e. wages and the schedule) and those that are internal (i.e. job task 
assignment). This section will examine what issues are negotiated for and what strategy 
employees use to achieve their goals. Additionally, I will consider the nature of 
autonomy and how it relates to negotiations in highly regulated environments.
External Issues
Under the heading of external issues, I will include all issues that constitute the 
economic rationale for obtaining a job, most notably, the wages, opportunity for 
advancement, security, and the schedule. These issues must be worked out but do not 
directly relate to the actual working conditions. The external issues are directly connected 
to the ‘outside’ non-work lives o f employees. The external issues are among the most 
critical of an employee’s life such as: whether or not an employee can move out of her or 
his house; is able to schedule time for college classes, another job, or a social life; or if he 
or she will lose sleep because he or she is afraid of being laid off. These negotiations may 
be particularly contentious because they have the gravest stakes for both employee and 
franchisee.
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Worker Autonomy and Negotiations 
Over External Issues
Autonomy refers to the freedom from employer control (Katz 1964). Autonomy may 
take the form of control over issues such as the schedule or job task assignment. The 
notion of autonomy relates to negotiations over external issues, in that workers who seek 
to negotiate for increased wages, security, and hours, do so by explicitly or tacitly 
sacrificing their personal autonomy. In some cases, the workers who have the most 
autonomy are those who do not wish to earn more than minimum wage or work a full 
(forty-hour or more) schedule. If an employee wishes to move from the periphery to the 
core, she or he may have to sacrifice some personal freedom. An employee who wants as 
many hours as possible may have to make some sacrifices in personal autonomy such as 
being willing to work weekends or closing shifts. This same employee may also have to 
be willing and able to satisfy the franchisee’s expectations. For example, the day after 
Shawn received a raise, he was called upon to forfeit his scheduled day off to cover for 
co-workers who had failed to show up. Conversely, employees who wish to receive very 
little in the way of take home pay, advancement, and security can commonly maintain a 
high level of autonomy. If the negotiation context includes a labor shortage, a worker 
who cares little about external issues may demand quite a lot in terms of autonomy (not 
working weekends, not performing certain job tasks like cleaning the toilets). An 
employer may concede some control to prevent the employee from leaving. However, 
that same employee may be ‘let go’ when the negotiation context changes. Some 
employees assess their personal situations and decide how much autonomy they should
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
83
give up in order to have their material needs met. An employee who is dependent on his 
or her position may be less willing to press for autonomy.
Wages
One of the most salient issues to be negotiated in any work environment is the 
employee wage rate. There is no escaping the fact that fast food labor is considered to be 
among the least skilled jobs in the United States. Due to the low value placed on fast food 
labor, workers have considerably depressed wages (Ritzer 1998). The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics reports that in 2000 the mean hourly wage for fast food cooks was S6.78 per 
hour and the mean wage for “Combined Food Preparation and Serving Workers, 
Including Fast Food” was $6.84 (http://www.bls.gov/oes/2000/oes_35Fo.htm). To some 
extent, the economic viability of fast food restaurants is predicated on the ability of 
restaurants to reduce labor costs. The economic pressure to pay employees as little as 
possible constitutes an important aspect o f the negotiation context. Employees do 
exercise some agency over their wages. Although, there may be limits to what a 
franchisee is willing to spend, the specific hourly wage of each employee is subject to 
implicit and explicit negotiation.
Implicit or indirect negotiation tended to be continual and imprecise (for more than 
one issue at once). An employee could broker for increased wages by simply presenting 
himself as a “good employee” that is to say a more competent, dependable, and 
trustworthy employee. By not (openly) engaging in deviant activities, by agreeing to 
substitute for truant coworkers, optimally performing job tasks and so forth an employee 
may place herself in a position to command a pay increase without explicit negotiation. 
For instance, when I was hired, I was informed that my initial wages was $6.00 per hour
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and that if  I was competent I could expect a pay raise. As it turned out, I was able to 
utilize my considerable Grinders experience at this location, to such an extent that I soon 
became recognized as a relatively useful employee and coworker. At the end of the first 
week, James informed me that I would be receiving a raise of S0.75 per hour. I had not 
asked for a raise. However, by satisfactorily performing my duties, I successfully (and 
unintentionally) bargained for a pay increase.
At this point, the reader might legitimately ask: How does this constitute implicit 
negotiation? Common sense would predict that competent employees are better paid than 
are incompetent employees. However, we must remember that in fast food restaurants (as 
in any number o f work environments) workers choose to be ‘good’ employees. To 
understand an employee’s decision to become competent we must consider the existential 
position of the individual actor. First, the decision to become a competent employee is 
not necessarily the same as the decision to retain one’s position. In some (but by no 
means all) negotiation contexts, the labor pressures are such that even a relatively 
incompetent or ‘poor’ employee may enjoy a surprisingly high degree of job security. I 
observed some employees who seemed to interpret the structural forces operating on the 
restaurant, and decided that since they had little desire to gamer a small increase in 
hourly pay, they would rather ‘slack o ff. Therefore, if  a worker may be able to remain 
employed without being a ‘model’ employee, workers who do attempt to meet what they 
believe to be the franchisee’s expectations are making a choice to do so. I am not making 
the argument that anyone can work well in fast food restaurants. Quite the contrary, 
despite the highly rationalized labor process, becoming a model fast food employee is 
very much an accomplishment. If a worker is to become a core or even a competent
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periphery member o f the organization, he or she must make the decision to do so. The 
attempt to move from the periphery to the core requires an individual to interpret the 
environment and the means necessary to achieve this goal. The industrious employee 
must learn how to perform the various job tasks successfully and to get along with the 
others, particularly the franchisee. This goal may be ‘easier said than done’ so to speak, 
as not everyone is successful. For the purposes of understanding how the social order of a 
franchised fast food restaurant is subject to negotiation, we can interpret the actions o f the 
competent employee as one who is implicitly negotiating for increased wages by 
choosing to be competent.
Negotiations over wages may also take place on an explicit level. Not all employees 
who wish to receive an increase in their wages are willing to wait to be rewarded for their 
silent efforts. Some employees, particularly those who see themselves as having achieved 
a certain importance or core status within the restaurant may feel more comfortable 
making their wishes known. The ultimate decision-maker is the franchisee. In the non- 
unionized and non-contractual fast food restaurant disagreements are often reduced to a 
‘take it or leave it’ situation. The employer will interpret the situation as he wishes 
regardless o f the structural context, and may choose to set the wages regardless of the 
structural context. The decision not to negotiate is itself an act of negotiation. 
Correspondingly, the employee must then decide whether to stay or to leave, which is 
also an act of negotiation.
A franchisee may decide that it is in her or his best interest to ‘work with’ an 
employee who requests a pay raise. On a certain holiday. Grinders is traditionally busy 
and is subsequently open later than usual. The predictably increased business is a part of
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the structural context. None of the core crewmembers wanted to work on this particularly 
difficult evening. The individual motivations o f the workers form an aspect of the 
negotiation context. James was not willing to give all of them the night off. Although, 
James was able to import one worker from another store, he still needed one more 
worker. The unlucky candidate was Shawn, who parlayed his anger at being forced to 
work when Maria and Juanita did not into a higher wage. After we finally finished 
closing the restaurant at about midnight, James and Kiran took Shawn and I to dinner. 
Shortly after our orders were taken, Shawn announced; “I need a raise!” He mentioned 
that his pay should be eight dollars per hour. It came up that Juanita and Maria, who have 
been with the restaurant longer, earn $8.00 per hour. Shawn related that the other core 
members had received the holiday off last year (the fact that he had to work this holiday 
two years in a row seemed to contribute to his resentment). Eventually, James relented to 
Shawn’s request. In some negotiation contexts, an assertive employee may succeed in 
bargaining for increased pay. This fact is demonstrated by Shawn, who was able to 
steadily negotiate for wage increases until he was earning as much as employees who 
were his senior in the restaurant. Although structural issues influence how much 
employees can expect to earn, the actual pay may be subject to individual negotiations of 
an atomized work force and the franchisee.
Promotion
As with other industries, an offer of a raise in wages may come with an increase in 
responsibility. A franchisee may decide that if higher wages are to be paid, the increase in 
outlay should come with a decrease in direct supervisory work for the franchisee.
Contrary to the common sense expectation that an employee will accept an opportunity
R e p ro d u c e d  with pe rm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
87
for promotion, in a fast food restaurant the desirability o f such advancement is far from 
guaranteed. One slow evening, Juanita explained to me that promotion was not a part o f 
her plans at Grinders.
“I wouldn’t be a manager.”
“Why wouldn’t you be a manager Juanita?”
“Cause I had to do it full time, I wanted to do it part-time cause I wanted to go to 
school.”
Juanita went on to relate that other managers experienced a significant reduction in 
personal autonomy. She rejected an offer of promotion because she feared that it would 
be difficult to keep up her studies if she accepted the encroachment on personal 
autonomy that comes with management. We can see that the terms of promotion are the 
subject of negotiation. Although the prospect o f increased pay was attractive, she was not 
at the restaurant for wages alone. For her, autonomy (particularly her control of the 
schedule) was a stronger motivation for working at Grinders than the wages. This finding 
is not surprising considering the relatively low expectations employees may have o f how 
much they can actually earn at a fast food restaurant. Juanita was not the only employee 
at Grinders to reject a promotion. One evening Shawn mentioned,
“After you left, when we went to [dinner], he [James] laid on me this offer to be 
manager at Placid Hills [James’ second location].”
“Why didn’t you take it?”
“I’m not desperate yet. When I’ve got an apartment, I might want the ten an hour.” 
Shawn, who still lived at home, was not sure that he needed the commitment of full 
time management. However, he would not rule out the possibility of accepting a
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managerial position. If  his personal circumstances changed, he may wish to take the 
promotion. Again, we see that the personal motivations of the actors impinge upon the 
social order of the restaurant. Moreover, one might infer that James has placed a limit on 
how much an employee may earn without taking on a significant increase responsibility. 
Of course, James’ offer comes because o f his interpretation o f Shawn as a competent and 
trustworthy employee. James has interpreted his fiscal situation to be healthy enough to 
delegate authority in exchange for increased labor expenditures. More likely than not. the 
promotional offer was an expression o f his personal desire to decrease the personal strain 
of owning two restaurants.
Security
In addition to negotiating for wage increases, the security of an employee’s position 
may be subject to negotiation. Security refers to a state of being insulated from the 
fluctuations o f the market place. This may take the form of security from being laid off or 
security from drastic cuts in scheduled hours. The structural context of some restaurants 
includes a variable amount of business throughout the year. For instance, some areas may 
depend on the business of seasonal travelers or tourists; some areas become inhospitable 
during the winter, and some restaurants specialize in items that have seasonal appeal. For 
whatever reason some franchisees may find that it is in their best interest to close down 
completely or drastically reduce the number of employees during a slower season. 
Presumably, most employees know o f the impending labor cuts. Employees may be 
forced to implicitly negotiate for a position o f security or be laid off or have their hours 
reduced. Those employees who only need the job for a brief time (like those who do not 
need a wage increase) may opt to retain a periphery role, sparing themselves what they
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may consider undue effort or strain. Other employees may decide that it is in their best 
interest to retain their position and their current schedule. Employees who wish to earn a 
measure of stability must decide to become as competent and trustworthy as possible.
The obvious reason for this is that, all things being equal, the franchisee will retain the 
most competent employees during the periodic slowdowns in business. During 
transitional periods, there can be an erratic flow of business. Workers who have been 
lulled to complacency will find that they are suddenly very busy. This transition can be 
difficult and requires a high level o f competence. When a franchisee contracts her or his 
labor force, it follows that the crew may find itself shorthanded. In order to avoid losing 
customers, the shorthanded crew must perform especially well. The issue of security is 
likely to be negotiated implicitly, as workers who wish to remain on the staff and or have 
their hours remain in tact will implicitly negotiate by demonstrating a high level of 
competence. The negotiations over the issue of security during slow times of the year 
may be affected by the emotions present in the negotiation context. When the negotiation 
context includes a conflation of primary and secondary relationships between workers 
and management, it may aid the cause of an employee who wishes to negotiate for 
increased job security. Despite the supposedly formal and impersonal relations that exist 
in rationalized environments, members of the restaurant may over time relate to each 
other on a personal basis. This is not to say that workers and employees become friends 
in any traditional sense of the word, but there may very well be a movement from market 
to moral relations. While it is doubtful that the individual actors in a restaurant ever lose 
sight of their personal interests, the conflation of primary and secondary relations may 
influence negotiations. For instance, it will be more difficult an employer to lay off an
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employee that he or she has come to know, than an employee who is less well known. In 
other words, a franchisee is more likely to attempt to “take care” of a long time employee 
than one with whom he or she has little emotional connection. I observed this tendency 
both through out my personal career at Grinders and at Anna’s.
The Schedule
Perhaps one o f the most salient issues to be negotiated in a fast food restaurant is the
schedule. The possible flexibility of scheduling is attractive to those with outside
commitments such as single mothers and students (Reiter 1991). Given the relatively
low-level of prestige, training, and money that can be derived from fast food employment
an adequate schedule may be a particularly salient issue. Two major themes circulate
around the issue o f scheduling. The first is the ability of an employee to work around
other aspects of their life such as extracurricular activities, a second job, parental
responsibilities, and education. The second theme is the ability of workers to gain enough
hours in order to be satisfied with one’s income. The following testimonies, presented by
Ivan Chamer and Bryna Shore Fraser (1984), exemplify the ability of some fast food
employees to obtain acceptable work schedules. One respondent related:
I found my grades dropping because I was working 4 or 5 
hours every school night and 8 or 9 hours on Saturday. I 
talked to my manager and we decided that it would be best 
for me to only work 4 hours during the school week, then 
more on the weekends. Many of my working friends have 
told me how fortunate I am to have such an understanding 
manager and suitable hours. This has been my experience 
working for both the company and a franchise (Chamer and 
Fraser 1984: 138-139).
However, some workers are not so successful. One respondent offered this statement:
I need more hours and more money with three children.
They will give the people that don’t want to work more
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hours and the ones that want to work won’t get any.
Something needs to be done or said (Chamer and Fraser 
1984:129).
Some fast food workers are far more successful at obtaining schedules that they find
acceptable than others. Chamer and Fraser, in a survey of over 4600 workers related:
a higher proportion of employees who have worked more 
than two years are satisfied with the way they are scheduled 
than are employees who have worked for a shorter length 
o f time. Sixty percent of those who have worked more than 
two years are satisfied compared to 53 percent and 44 
percent for those employees who have worked 13-24 
months and one year or less respectively (1984:48).
We may conjecture that the longer an employee remains at a single restaurant, the
stronger her or his bargaining position may become. Perhaps, as a worker remains at a
single location, he or she becomes more indispensable, trusted, and well regarded by the
person that sets the schedule. Additionally, we might conjecture that employers attempt
to negotiate for a stable workforce by providing competitive schedules.
Employees are not likely to obtain a desired schedule without implicit or explicit 
negotiation. In the negotiated order of the fast food restaurant, workers do not necessarily 
form a collective entity against management. An atomized labor force is just as likely to 
be in competition with itself as it is to be in conflict with employers. Conflicts over which 
employees get a schedule that is favorable to them is one area where we can see 
employees in competition over an issue that is of diminished importance to the manager. 
If the schedule is filled with capable workers, who gets which days off is not of likely to 
be of primary importance to most managers or franchisees. However, who receives what 
day off can be o f great importance to the employees. Employees who are in a better 
negotiating position will most likely have more control o f the schedule. The ability to
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control one’s schedule is an important area o f autonomy and may be a major reason why
some workers remain at a restaurant. This is evidenced by Juanita who asserted:
You can write your own schedule, that’s why I’m still here.
You see him [the franchisee James] ask me what days I’m 
available.
Not everyone is in the same bargaining position when it comes to the hashing out who
will work when. Juanita explains:
Shawn doesn’t understand that we get to write our own 
schedule because we’ve been here longer. He’s still in high 
school. We’re [her and Maria] are in college. Paul realizes 
we’ve got to study.
The schedule was an essential issue at Grinders. James was at the center of 
scheduling conflicts. About a week after the conflict over holiday scheduling, another 
scheduling controversy arose as Shawn was scheduled to work on a Saturday, after he 
had requested to not work weekends. In the past week, Shawn had worked a holiday that 
he had requested to have off, and the following day he sacrificed his day off to cover for 
three truant co-workers. Being told to work on Saturday was more than Shawn would 
stand. He believed that he was being taken advantage of because o f his willingness to be 
versatile. Shawn confronted James. Shawn refused to work Saturday. James replied by 
telling Shawn that he would let him go if  he did not work on Saturday. Shawn, aware of 
his value to the restaurant and believing that James was “bluffing,” refused to back down. 
At this point, it seemed as though both men had drawn a line in the sand and now pride 
and emotionality were eclipsing pure economic rationality. Presumably, Shawn resigning 
would not be in the best interest of either man. James, running his restaurant with a small 
and oftentimes unstable crew relied on Shawn, who despite being assertive is a very 
competent employee. Shawn, on the other hand, certainly would not benefit from losing
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his job. The existing social order o f the restaurant depended on a resolution to this 
conflict, yet neither party seemed willing to retreat.
Fortunately, Juanita, who had recently decided that she would like to purchase an 
automobile, entered the negotiations. In order to reach her goal she would have to work 
as many hours as possible. A few days before the stand off she began to badger James for 
more hours. When Juanita saw that James had offered Shawn an ultimatum, and realizing 
that Shawn would be fired before he or James would acquiesce, she intervened by 
offering to work on Saturday. In this situation, the entrance of a third party into the 
negotiations, allowed both actors to attain their goals without either having to ‘back 
down’. Both James and Shawn maintained their pride without permanently sacrificing 
their business relationship. It should be noted that Juanita was not operating on purely 
selfish motivations. She did not want to see Shawn fired needlessly. The next day, when 
she and I were working alone together (the day that she was covering for Shawn), she 
asserted “I saved Shawn from getting fired.” When I contended that she was happy to 
obtain his hours, she vehemently denied the charge. While I personally do not believe 
that her offer to work Shawn’s shift and her desire to earn money to purchase an 
automobile are completely independent o f each other, I do believe that she had acted with 
concern for Shawn.
This incident reveals a number o f aspects of the negotiation of social order in a fast 
food restaurant. First, there is often a conflation of primary and secondary social roles. 
Co-workers and employers all have a formal, economic basis for their interaction. 
Ostensibly, actors in a highly routinzed or McDonaldized setting would have impersonal 
economically defined relations with each other (Ritzer 1993:1998). Although the basis
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for the relationships among crewmembers is certainly economically defined, non- 
economically rational feelings o f camaraderie tend to arise. These non-economically 
rational feelings affect the negotiation context. People will have more than their own 
personal goals in mind when they interact. Juanita’s willingness to cover Shawn’s 
Saturday shift, (a day she usually did not like working) was most likely influenced by her 
desire to earn more money and her desire to see Shawn remain employed at the 
restaurant. Within a given setting, the motivations of individual workers can rarely be 
reduced to a single motivation. Nor can social relationships be sharply defined, even in an 
environment that has been subject to strict routinization.
Temporal Limits o f Negotiations 
Over External Issues
The interaction of the actors is influenced by a confluence o f dynamic motivations.
As the desires of individual actors change, like when Juanita decided that she wanted to 
earn enough money to buy a car, these individuals may seek to renegotiate the social 
order to reach their new goals. The social order must be renegotiated in response to 
changes in the negotiation context. This phenomenon occurs in fast food restaurants as 
the structural forces, like the economy or the weather may affect the volume of the 
business of the restaurant, thus changing the negotiation context. This is clearly 
exemplified when a given shift is far slower than anticipated by management. One slow 
evening at Anna’s, Sandra decided that her presence would not be missed and that she 
would like to go home. However, she did not want to offend Fred. On the other hand,
Fred, who earnestly maintained that he would have not have asked anyone to leave, did 
not mind reducing his labor costs. Neither Sandra nor Fred wanted to offend the other.
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but the negotiation context had changed, and they subsequently could benefit from a 
renegotiation of the schedule. By gingerly approaching the subject, they worked out an 
agreement that was mutually beneficial. In doing so, they were careful to take the role of 
the other to avoid damaging their relationship.
Internal Issues
There is more to be negotiated than external issues. The working conditions are of 
tremendous importance to employees and franchisees alike. There is more to any job than 
its potential for income, and this is especially true in fast food restaurants where a 
routinization of the labor process has depressed wages. Everything from job task 
assignment to choice of radio station to the definition o f deviance must be worked out 
and compromised upon. Fast food restaurants are designed with the intention of 
controlling workers in the minutest detail. Much like Paules’ waitresses, fast food 
employees may, depending on the negotiation context and their motivations actively 
resist managerial control (1991). This is not to say that workers always are successful or 
that they always attempt to expand their autonomy. Nonetheless, sometimes through a 
process of implicit or explicit negotiation, workers may increase their autonomy, and 
subsequently gain control o f their working conditions. This section will be divided into 
three parts. One section will consider the general working conditions o f the restaurant, 
which involves any legitimate issue that may be negotiated in the restaurant. Another 
section will consider the negotiations over the definition o f deviance. First, we will 
examine how autonomy relates to negotiations over internal issues.
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Worker Autonomy and Negotiation 
Over Internal Issues
The rationalized labor process requires the tight control o f  employees. There is a 
correct way of doing things. Management at Grinders and Anna’s did not attempt to 
achieve the totality of control that has been reported by other ethnographers (Garson 
1988, Reiter 1991, Leidner 1993). Neither James nor Fred are particularly interested in 
single handedly doing what requires several managers, assistant managers, and crew 
trainers at larger more highly differentiated restaurants. James and Fred did not seek to 
control laborers arbitrarily. Both Franchisees were willing to be lax on a number of 
issues. Their largest concern was that the customers were satisfied. Neither franchisee 
required his employees to wear an elaborate uniform. There were no nametags or work 
issue pants. Workers at Grinders and Aima’s were not expected to engage in the highly 
unpopular practice o f “suggestive selling” (Leidner 1993:139).
Employees will usually have to increase their autonomy to make the job conditions fit 
their desires. At a Grinders restaurant where I was employed before my time with James, 
my employer seemed happy to allow me to use the telephone or do my school work 
during slow periods. I presume that his reasoning was, in part, to encourage me to remain 
at the restaurant, and because it was cheaper to allow these indulgences than it was to pay 
a higher wage. Many times employee gains in autonomy seem to come at the expense of 
material gains. Employers may compensate for the low wages by allowing favored 
workers increased freedom. The degree to which workers are free is an important 
component of the social order o f the restaurant. Worker autonomy is always subject to 
negotiation and as will be seen later is connected to negotiations over the job conditions.
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Issues such as the definition o f deviance, which workers will perform what tasks, and 
which radio stations can be played, are all aspects o f the job conditions that are directly 
related to how free workers are from employer control.
General Conditions
On any given day, innumerable issues may be the subjects o f implicit or explicit 
negotiation. These issues may be relatively benign such as who will take their break first 
or something far more controversial such as whom will clean the toilet. While these 
issues do not directly affect an employee outside o f the restaurant, they take on a great 
deal of significance within the milieu. As with the external issues, negotiations over the 
general working conditions may lead some employees to come into conflict with each 
other or with the franchisee. Conversely, negotiations over other issues may be 
cooperative.
The Radio
One issue of potential significance is the choice of radio station. Working in a fast 
food restaurant may provide few opportunities for enjoyable stimuli. The work can be 
hectic, the hours long, and the public unforgiving. One area that may greatly improve 
working conditions is the radio. Use o f the radio is one of the issues of negotiation 
identified by Morgan in his study of the negotiated order of the factory (1975). When I 
was first hired at a certain Grinders restaurant (years before working for James) there 
were specific rules governing which radio stations were acceptable and which were 
unacceptable. Unfortunately for me, the radio station that I had grown accustomed to at a 
previous Grinders owned by a different franchisee was specifically off limits at this 
location. I was a recent addition in an industry that is renowned for its high turnover rate.
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I was a periphery member o f the crew and subsequently my negotiating position was 
relatively weak. I suffered through a winter of dance pop. However, a few months later. I 
had proven myself a reliable employee and some o f the other core members had left the 
restaurant. My bargaining position had improved vastly, because my leaving would have 
caused hardship to the manager who controlled the radio (if I resigned this manager 
would have been forced to cover my night shift until a replacement could be found and 
trained). One day, I asked the manager, who had been upholding the ban on my favorite 
station, if  I could change the radio station. We worked out an arrangement where I could 
listen to whatever station I wanted to after he had left for the day. This is significant in 
that it shows that a non-managerial employee may be able to increase his autonomy in the 
restaurant in a highly regulated system.
The radio was not a divisive issue at Anna’s largely because the actors cooperated 
with each other. Fred set the guidelines o f what was and what not acceptable. For 
instance, hard rock was not an acceptable option during the day. Employees negotiated 
within the parameters set by Fred. I asked Dianne, “Who decides the radio station?” She 
replied:
Fred’s wife. When she goes we work it out. I don’t want 
rap or heavy metal. I don’t mind the more contemporary 
stuff if  they don’t mind my playing oldies once in a while.
The employees were able to negotiate with each other within guidelines established 
by Fred and Cary. I witnessed a very even give and take. During my observations, I 
listened to oldies, country, and contemporary adult. At Anna’s the choice o f radio station 
was an example of how employees and franchisees may explicitly negotiate an element 
of their shared existence.
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Effort
Given the popular portrayal of the fast food restaurant, one might imagine that 
workers are locked into Chaplinesque world of timers, buzzers, industrial sized spatulas 
and savagely effective deep fryers. Reiter uses the Charlie Chaplin film. Modern Times, 
as an analogy to fast food work, concluding, “thanks, to employment standards 
legislation, most workers can stop their work to have lunch, in almost every other way, 
Chaplin’s vision o f a highly controlled workplace has been realized” (1991:111). 
However, the popular image of the fast food restaurant that is portrayed by Reiter (1991) 
neglects the long periods o f downtime in many restaurants and the difficulty those 
employers sometimes have in fully extracting the labor power from recalcitrant 
employees. According to the Tayloristic logic o f business management, the worker 
should be as productive as possible. That means that every paid moment of a worker’s 
day should in some way be spent in service to the restaurant (Braverman 1974; Reiter 
1991). No doubt countless fast food workers have come across a manager or a franchisee 
who has uttered the words “If there’s time to lean there’s time to clean.” In my 
experiences and observations, it is difficult for management to implement this maxim. 
With the possible exception o f a severely depressed economy, an employer will have a 
great deal of trouble attempting to be a ‘slave driver’ of workers who are being paid 
minimum wage. Employees ‘slack o ff when there are no customers. Workers who are 
slacking off may eat, smoke, read, or speak with each other. Many workers reject 
managerial attempts to make every second productive. One former co-worker responded 
to the “time to lean” dictum with one of his own, “Minimum wage means minimum 
effort.” Some franchisees may feel that because they are offering comparatively low-
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levels of remuneration, they cannot ethically or consistently (that is without losing 
employees) extract a maximum expenditure sustained effort on the part o f employees.
Fred, who once was a manager in a large highly Taylorized firm, said that he enjoyed
the autonomy o f being an employer, because he had the ability to let up on his
employees, a luxury that he did not have as a manager. As the owner, he had the choice
to not to push his workers every second of their shift, as long as the customers were
attended to. Fred explained:
They can goof off a little bit, but when people come in, 
they have to be taken care of. People have this image of 
fast food. They don’t want to wait.
A factor of the negotiation context is that Fred’s emotional and ethical distaste for
working his workers too hard. He spent a great deal of time at his restaurant, which
reduced the autonomy of his employees significantly. The employees at Anna’s did not
have the option of remaining idle for long stretches of time, even if  there were no
customers. When the restaurant slowed down, Fred would have the employees clean the
restaurant.
Employees are also interested in the effort expended by their co-workers. 
Ethnographers have observed how what might be termed ‘peer pressure’ is used to 
encourage workers to perform effectively. Leidner (1993) writes, “it seemed to me that 
most workers did conceive o f the work as a team effort and were loath to be seen by their 
peers as making extra work for other people by not doing their share (p. 77). As may 
easily be imagined, the workload at a restaurant is largely uncontrolled by employees. If 
one employee is not effective, the other employees are expected to ‘pick up the slack’ so 
to speak. Harmed employees may levy sanctions in the form of jokes or complaints or
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even retaliatory slacking. At Grinders, a few employees (Juanita, Shawn, and I) would 
rotate as the primary closers (often the most senior closer would be in charge of the 
closing procedure). The two workers who closed the restaurant had a set amount of tasks 
to complete before they could leave. If an employee working in the afternoon failed to 
work effectively, the lack o f effort would have repercussions for those who had to close 
after the offending worker had left. A worker who continually leaves his or her 
coworkers in a bad position may find that they return the favor when it is her or his turn 
to close the restaurant. One evening, I was scheduled to close and Shawn was scheduled 
to leave a few hours before closing, Shawn related that he was working hard for me 
because I had worked hard for him the previous day. One could speculate that if I had not 
worked well for him he would be less inclined to work well for me. Employees at 
Grinders continually negotiate an agreement to work competently, in part so that no one 
will be purposely left with an inordinate amount of work to do.
Visitors
One issue that may arise during periods of “down time” is if  workers are allowed to 
accept personal visitors. One may assume that the worker is placed in a deeply 
regimented environment where there is little time for social interaction amongst 
crewmembers, much less between a crewmember and his or her family and friends. First, 
we have to consider the motivations of the employees. With some exceptions, the 
crewmembers at Grinders did not seem to want to be interested in receiving visitors. So 
receiving visitors was not an issue.
At Anna’s, Sandra would occasionally receive visits from family members. Typically, 
they would chat for a few minutes and then she would return to work. Sometimes she
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would intermittently wait on customers. Fred allowed her to receive visitors in part 
because she had proven herself a valuable employee. Moreover, the brief visits did not 
interfere with her ability to perform her job tasks. By continually demonstrating her 
competence, Sandra implicitly negotiated for the right to have visitors, thus increasing 
her autonomy. Although this is a relatively small issue, the fact that Sandra was able to 
receive visitors reveals how workers, in some negotiation contexts, may be able to 
increase their autonomy, should they want to.
Job Task Assignment 
In fast food restaurants with a high division o f labor all of the tasks such as food 
preparation, cleaning, and serving have been broken down to the point where a number o f 
workers can perform highly specific tasks. At this type o f restaurant, a manager will 
assign crewmembers to various tasks. Reiter describes this type o f arrangement in some 
detail (1991). Although the potential for this degree of rationalization exists at both 
Grinders and Anna’s, as a rule, neither restaurant employed enough workers to operate in 
that manner. On occasion, Kiran and Fred would assign job tasks. However, the 
fi-anchisees rarely assigned jobs, and when they did it was usually on a slow day where 
workers would have difficulty deciding what (if anything) to do without direction. More 
often, employees were left to decide amongst themselves who would do which jobs. 
Workers were not directed in large part, because with the exception of neophyte 
employees, everyone knew what needed to be done. Employees would negotiate 
implicitly and explicitly for various tasks. Many employees had preferences for some job 
tasks and an aversion to others. An employee might implicitly negotiate for a task by 
simply beginning the task. In these circumstances, core members had an advantage
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because they possessed the cultural knowledge o f when was the optimum time to begin a 
task. At Grinders, Shawn and Maria would frequently begin work on food preparation as 
soon as the lunch rush tapered off. They were able to use their experience to implicitly 
claim desired job tasks. Periphery members who had not obtained the specific cultural 
capital to challenge the claims of the core members had little choice but to find an 
alternative task. Workers who dislike a certain task may claim the unwanted task as ‘off 
limits.’ For example, one afternoon Maria announced, “My name is Mar-i-a and I don’t 
clean bathrooms.” Maria was a core member o f the crew and could decide not to perform 
some job tasks, because she was able to perform other tasks competently. In order to get 
through the day more smoothly, employees who were not officially managers may assign 
tasks to peripheral crewmembers. For instance, the first time we closed Grinders together, 
Shawn who was very adept at closing the restaurant told me what tasks to do and when to 
do them. I accepted his authority as legitimate despite the absence of a formal managerial 
title, because it was to our mutual benefit to close the restaurant as efficiently as possible. 
At Anna’s, Sandra and Diane, who had spent a great deal of time working together, 
would alternate job tasks. As customers came in one would make desserts and the other 
would make lunch items. One would go to the drive though window and the other would 
go the register. They had learned how to negotiate the social order by simply reacting to 
each other.
Unacceptable and Acceptable Deviance 
Fast food restaurants are based on Taylor’s scientific management, which strictly 
delineates what constitutes proper workplace behavior. Ideally, the franchisor is not 
simply selling a name and national advertising; rather it is selling an entire formula for a
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business. The logic o f the franchise is that a web of semi-independent entrepreneurs each 
operates their restaurants according to similar principles. Many customers are attracted to 
the predictability offered by franchised restaurants (Ritzer 1993). Therefore, in theory, 
franchises have one correct way of doing things. However, there are situations when 
employees and even franchisees may find it in their best individual interests to deviate 
from the plan. In doing so, they must renegotiate the meaning of deviance. Consequently, 
a new definition o f deviance may emerge. When negotiations are unsuccessful, the social 
order is damaged, often with an employee’s tenure being terminated.
Deviance may take on a number of different forms. There is acceptable deviance and 
unacceptable deviance. Acceptable deviance includes all behaviors that deviate from the 
official way of doing things but are not considered deviant in the actual practice of 
everyday life. Unacceptable deviance includes all behaviors that deviate from the 
workplace norms. Unacceptable deviance includes actions that, if discovered, would 
require sanctioning (usually dismissal or resignation). The ongoing negotiations over 
deviance generally involve whether a behavior is defined as acceptable deviance or 
unacceptable deviance. There are different types o f deviance. There is procedural 
deviance when the franchisee or the crewmembers perform a given job task in a way that 
differs from the written proscription. There is deviance from the established work place 
norms. These behaviors would include giving food away, or not showing up for a 
scheduled shift. This section will focus on negotiations over which behavior is acceptable 
and what is unacceptable. Behaviors that are unacceptable beyond the pale of negotiation 
(such as giving away food) need not be considered here.
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The franchisor, the franchisee, regulatory agencies, employees, and customers each 
have an interest in the definition of deviance. While many actors, play a role in defining 
deviance the franchisee and the employees are the ones who must act with or against the 
existing norms. The franchisee was often placed in a position of having to enforce 
regulations that were not of his or her making but could be damaging if ignored by the 
crewmembers. The franchisee must also tailor the general regulations to the specific 
location. Some rules may or may not be appropriate to the specific situation. The 
franchisee must attempt to communicate the definition of deviance to the crewmembers. 
In general, the franchisee is the one who sanctions the employees. The sanctions 
generally include reduced hours, reduced autonomy, or termination of employment. The 
franchisee’s ability to dismiss employees gives him or her the right to define what 
constitutes deviant behavior. Employees are not powerless in their negotiations. 
Employees can interpret their situation and choose to follow a deviant practice i f  they 
believe they will not be discovered, that they are not worried about being terminated, or 
that the negotiation context is such that it would be unwise for the franchisee to sanction 
them for a given act. Their actions may take the form of implicit negotiations if  they 
choose to act in a deviant manner despite the fact that they will most likely be discovered.
In actually having to follow the rules, franchisees and employees may choose to 
accept or attempt to renegotiate the imposed order. Depending on their motivations, the 
franchisee and the crewmembers may or may not be brought into conflict or cooperation 
over whether or not a given practice is deviant. Oftentimes both the franchisee and 
employees have little difficulty following the rules that have been set for them without 
deviation. At Grinders, the franchisor has devised a formula for making sandwiches. For
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the franchisor to impose a different policy or for an employee to experiment with 
radically different bread slicing techniques, would constitute deviant behavior. Neither 
the franchisee nor the employees had any reason to reject the rules about bread slicing.
As Leidner reported, routinization is not intrinsically problematic (1993).
However, there were a number of official rules that are inconvenient to either the 
franchisee or the crewmembers. When the original rules do not benefit the franchisee, he 
or she may decide not to transmit these rules to her or his employees. The franchisee may 
decide to work out the rules on an individual basis, keeping one set o f rules for some 
employees and a different set of rales for others. At Grinders, there is a specific formula 
for preparing all o f the menu items. The rales prescribe the number o f tomatoes on a 
large sandwich, the width o f the green peppers, and the order that items should be placed 
on the sandwich. Usually, the rales are a helpful guide. Sometimes, however, the rales 
are an unnecessary hindrance. For example, the manual proclaims that when making 
seafood salad, the employee should measure the amount o f mayonnaise to be mixed with 
the seafood salad. Kiran and James would train the periphery employees to prepare the 
salad according to the written instructions. Measuring the mayonnaise seemed an 
unnecessary waste o f time to most of the people that have performed the chore more than 
once. After I had been shown how to measure the mayonnaise, I noticed that none o f the 
core members bothered to follow this norm. When it was my turn to make the salad, I 
followed the norm that was specific to the restaurant and measured the mayonnaise by 
eye. Kiran saw me and began to reprimand me.
Kiran: Y ou are supposed to measure the mayonnaise
Eric: I’ve been doing it like this for years. Jesus, I mess up the wraps and now I
can’t do anything right.
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Kiran: No its ju st... we all measure by eye I forgot you have the most experience.
I explicitly negotiated for a redefinition of what was considered deviant. I cited my 
previous experience as being the basis for my claim that the practice o f forgoing the 
measurement o f the mayonnaise should be acceptably deviant. I then proceeded to add 
too much mayonnaise to the salad.
The negotiation context may allow workers an opportunity to redefine what forms of 
deviance are acceptable and what are prohibited. In most workplaces repeatedly calling in 
sick or failing to show up for a scheduled shift, even with an excuse, would be 
unacceptable. Not working when scheduled is a form of deviance that may easily lead to 
dismissal. At Grinders, some workers seemed to interpret the high turnover rate at the 
restaurant as providing an opportunity for them to avoid unwanted shifts without having 
sanctions imposed on them. Not appearing for a scheduled shift may be an implicit 
method of negotiating for a day off. Sometimes ignoring the schedule is a more effective 
means of avoiding an unwanted shift than explicitly negotiating for a schedule change.
Not showing up for a shift was a common occurrence. O f the twenty shifts that I worked 
at Grinders, there were eight instances o f workers not appearing for shifts that they were 
scheduled to work. This is not to say that every time that a person failed to show up it 
there was no ‘valid’ excuse. However, it was widely speculated that some of the absences 
were illegitimate. One frustrated crewmember exclaimed to the franchisee, “You don’t 
have enough people. They know you ain’t going to fire them, so they don’t show up.”
The fact that James did not fire the employees that were suspected o f illegitimately 
calling off from work supports the employee’s claims. The employees who failed to show 
up had implicitly acted to push for the acceptability o f a deviant behavior that could be
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defined as unacceptable. James, in passing, mentioned that he would eventually fire the 
worst offender. I suspect that he would redefine the act of failing to show up for a shift as 
unacceptable only after the negotiation context changes in such a way that would allow 
him to remove certain employees without damaging his other interests.
The definition of deviance was a far less volatile topic at Anna’s. Workers seemed to 
have little motivation to redefine the behaviors or practices that are labeled as deviant by 
the franchisee. Months upon months of ongoing negotiations had led to a stable definition 
of acceptable and unacceptable practices. Fred was by no means a ‘slave driver’ and he 
did not create rules arbitrarily. So long as the customers’ needs were met and the 
restaurant’s equipment was treated properly, Fred was not interested in enforcing the 
rules simply for the sake of exercising authority. Likewise, the employees were largely 
unconcerned with redefining deviance. Anna’s did provide one example of the 
negotiation over deviance. Years ago, Fred did not allow employees to chew gum while 
they worked. This policy was a source of consternation amongst gum chewing 
employees. They implicitly negotiated for a redefinition o f deviance by taking it upon 
themselves to chew gum in a manner that would not disgust customers. Eventually, Fred 
conceded the right to chew gum, so long as it was done in a tasteful manner. Fred did not 
want the sight of lip smacking, gum chewing employees to offend customers. However, 
he did not have any desire to needlessly deny his employees something that might 
improve their working conditions. When his core employees demonstrated that they 
could avoid violating the spirit of his policy despite deviating from the letter of the rules, 
Fred accepted the implicit negotiation, providing that the employees continued to act with 
respect to the customers.
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Conclusion
Through an analysis o f observations of two franchises, we may conclude that the 
social order o f a restaurant is achieved, in part, through implicit and explicit negotiation. 
After describing Anna’s and Grinders, I presented a generalized description of the cast of 
actors in a fast food restaurant, and their relationship to the negotiation context. While 
franchisees have a great deal of power in negotiations, they also depend on the other 
actors. Although, fast food jobs are designed to make employees interchangeable, core 
employees may find that they can cancel negotiations more easily than their employer 
can. In other words, in some contexts, core employees may have an easier time replacing 
their employers than their employer would have replacing them. Employees may exploit 
this feature of the negotiation context to their benefit.
There are two types of negotiation (both external and conditions) that are subject to 
the processes o f negotiation. Actors choose how to negotiate based on their interpretation 
of the situation and their own proclivities. Depending on their strategy, skills and relative 
power, employees may be able to achieve their goals. For instance, for the external issue 
of wages, employees may negotiate implicitly by attempting to become a core member of 
the restaurant or explicitly by stating he or she would like to receive. An actor may 
choose to use both methods in tandem. Actors will interpret the negotiation context and 
act accordingly. For instance, when Shawn avoided negotiation because of a previous 
argument or when James placated me after I had worked alone during a difficult shift.
Considering the highly rationalized design o f franchised fast food restaurants, the 
nature o f deviance is quite interesting. The different types of actors have potentially 
disparate interpretations of the social norms. The high priority placed on ‘correct’ rational
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action, as well as the different positions of actors, results in a continuous negotiation over 
the definition o f deviance. There are two types o f deviant actions, acceptable and 
unacceptable. When actors are able to agree that a certain behavior while technically 
deviant is not harmful; it will be considered acceptably deviant. For instance, at Grinders, 
employees mixed salads without actually measuring the mayonnaise as prescribed in the 
Grinders operations manual. The definition of some acts depends on the negotiation 
context. For example, oftentimes employees who fail to show up for a shift are 
terminated. At Grinders, the negotiation context was such that employees who failed to 
appear for scheduled shifts were not sanctioned. Through implicit negotiation (not 
coming to a scheduled shift), employees changed the definition o f deviance, and what 
was formerly unacceptable became marginally acceptable. Of course, once the 
negotiation context changes again (i.e. when labor pressures become less intense) not 
appearing for scheduled shifts will again become an unacceptable act. In the next chapter,
I will summarize the findings and consider the implications for future research.
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CONCLUSION
An analysis o f data from two fast food restaurants supports the negotiated order 
perspective’s assumptions that all social order is dependent upon some form of 
negotiation and those negotiations are influenced by social structure. Contrary to popular 
portrayal, fast food workers are not always incapable o f meeting their ends. Despite 
scientific management, the dearth o f employment options, and the myriad o f other 
structural features that systematically weaken individuals in low-level food service work, 
there are conditions wherein workers, may choose to increase their autonomy. Although 
fast food restaurants can be viewed as the “paradigm case of the rationalization process” 
(Ritzer 1993:18) workers are not simply passive tools o f a corporation’s formalized plan 
of action. Fast food employees are active agents. However, their ability to reach their 
goals is influenced by the subjective interpretation of the structural forces that impinge on 
the milieu. While actors often had opposed interests, their ability to reach their respective 
goals usually required some cooperation with the other actors. The social order of the 
restaurant depends on the ability of the organizational members to agree to work with 
each other. The notion that social order is continually achieved was demonstrated in the 
analysis.
The two franchises were analyzed using the conceptual devices of the negotiated 
order perspective. The salient features o f the structural and negotiation context were
111
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elucidated. Negotiations did not occur in a vacuum. The structural forces that affected the 
workers’ attempts to reach their aims included the economy, the unemployment rate, the 
number of similar jobs, the weather, the legal order, and so forth. The negotiation context 
included such features as motivations, personal skills, and emotions.
The preceding analysis provided an outline of the issues that are negotiated in a fast 
food restaurant. Although the outline may not be comprehensive, most possible topics of 
negotiation could be subsumed in the rubric of external issues (i.e. wages, promotion, and 
scheduling) as well as internal issues (i.e. job task assignment, the definition o f deviance, 
and sundry daily concerns). The process by which these issues were worked out at two 
franchises has already been considered. The data drawn from observations and personal 
experience are highly specific to the setting. However, the processes of negotiation that 
were observed in the restaurants have implications for the sociological understanding of 
fast food restaurants, the nature of autonomy in regulated enviromnents, the negotiated 
order perspective, and the interplay between structure and individual agency.
Fast Food Restaurants 
Using the negotiated order perspective yields an improvement in our understanding of 
fast food restaurants. The ethnographies of fast food restaurants provide a sort of natural 
experiment, wherein we may begin to speculate about how different structural conditions 
may lead to differences in the lived experiences o f workers. This study demonstrates a 
number of features o f fast food restaurants. The findings include the need for a typology 
of fast food restaurants, the differences between core and periphery employees, a 
typology o f negotiated issues, and the limits of autonomy in fast food restaurants.
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More than McDonald’s 
Ethnographies and journalistic accounts o f fast food restaurants have focused on 
McDonald’s or similarly designed franchises. There is a pronounced tendency to conflate 
McDonald’s restaurants with the entire fast food industry. There is diversity amongst the 
fast food restaurants that use scientific management to control the labor process. Fast 
food restaurants that are unlike McDonald’s restaurants are not simply deviations from a 
statistical mean. There are thousands of franchised fast food restaurants that are 
significantly less differentiated than McDonald’s, offer different menu items, are fewer in 
number, and have different franchising arrangements, (Eberts and Gisler 1989; Jakle and 
Sculle 1999; Schlosser 2001). Even though McDonald’s and similar restaurants have 
received the bulk of the attention in ethnographic and journalistic accounts of fast food 
restaurants, there are many workers that are in similar (pay, prestige) positions who have 
significantly different lived experiences at their respective jobs. The creation of a 
typology o f franchised fast food restaurants exceeds the scope of this study. However, the 
data presented here point to the diversity of structure in fast food restaurants.
This variety o f structural conditions may allow for drastic differences in the lived 
experiences o f workers. A comparison of this study with ethnographic accounts of 
McDonald’s and Burger King might lead us to the following speculations (Reiter 1991; 
Leidner 1993; Royle 2000). A relatively simple division o f labor may allow workers to 
deal more directly with their employer. The fewer the levels o f management the easier it 
may be for workers to negotiate with their employer directly rather than a manager or 
assistant manager. A franchisee has far more autonomy than a manager does. A 
franchisee has the authority to change the work environment while a manager has a
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prescribed authority. However, a franchisee may also have a greater personal stake in the 
given negotiation than a manager will. The outcome of employee-management 
negotiations is partially influenced by the division of labor and the depth of the hierarchy. 
However, this influence is not likely to be uniform.
Issues to be Negotiated 
Additionally, this study adds to the existing studies of negotiated order in rationalized 
environments by creating a typology of issues that are subject to negotiation in the 
workplace. Issues that are subject to negotiation are of two general types. The first type 
o f issue includes all external issues that are directly related to an employee’s nor-work 
life. External issues include but may not be confined to remuneration, scheduling, 
promotion, and job security. The second general type o f issues to be negotiated are 
internal issues job that affect an employee during the working day, such as the definition 
o f deviance or the control of the labor process. Any researcher analyzing a rationalized 
workplace with the negotiated order perspective may employ this typology.
Core and Periphery Employees 
In a highly rationalized environment, workers who share similar formal positions will 
have different places in the organization. This study further elucidates an observation by 
Leidner (1993) that core employees will have different experiences than other workers. 
There are two general types of employees. Some fast food employees form the core o f the 
work crew while others lie along the periphery. There is often a difference between core 
and periphery employees in terms of differential ends and means. The data show a 
patterned relationship between an employee’s status (core or periphery) and what they 
may hope to achieve for themselves. Core employees will have a slightly different set of
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possible goals than periphery employees, as well as a different repertoire of possible 
means to attain those goals. One’s status as a core or periphery employee is hardly static. 
An individual may find that one status may work for a specific set of goals, but a change 
in status may be required if  the worker’s goals should change. A worker who wants to 
work part-time and would like to minimize his or her responsibility may find that a high 
autonomy periphery status and the expectations that go with that are adequate for his 
needs. However, if  that same worker finds that she or he needs to increase his earnings 
due to a change in his personal circumstances (such as tuition or new lodgings) she or he 
may negotiate for a wage raise by actively becoming a core member of the group. The 
terms core and periphery are neither clear nor distinct. They relate to a relative status 
within the group as opposed to a formally defined position. A person may be more or less 
core or periphery to the group. There is a fluid continuum between core and periphery.
An employee may move from the periphery to the core and back again. A core employee 
may move even closer to the core. Either type of employee can leave suddenly, however 
a periphery employee will be far more likely to leave than will a core employee.
The Unstable Nature of Fast Food Employment 
The restaurants that were observed were marked by their relative instability.
Unskilled fast food employees are easily replaced and therefore less powerful (Reiter 
1991). Fast food work exemplifies the deskilling of the labor force (Ritzer 1998). In as 
much as fast food labor has been deskilled so that workers have become replaceable, 
there are now such a multitude o f fast food restaurants, each offering a similar lack of 
security, benefits, training, prestige, and wages that employers have become as 
replaceable as their deskilled employees. Instability is a structural component even in the
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most harmonious restaurant. Reiter relates that disgruntled employees may oiten choose 
to “vote with their feet” (1991:155). The ease with which franchisees may be replaced 
may play a role in franchisees being as attentive as possible to ‘reasonable’ employee 
demands. As Fred explained, “If someone wants a day off I just give it to him. Otherwise, 
he could be at Burger King next week.” Although franchisees hold ultimate authority 
over how much autonomy their employees have or who will remain employed at the 
restaurant they must make some concessions to their employees are to be retained. The 
absence of a contract and the relative ease with which employees and employers may end 
the relationship play a large role in workplace negotiations. As Strauss notes, ‘‘'options to 
avoiding or discontinuing negotiation” are an important variable in the negotiation 
context (emphasis in original) (1978:100). Employees or employers in fast food 
restaurants may be more or less willing to make concessions during a conflict over a 
specific issue depending on their interpretation of the ease with which the other could be 
replaced. Some structural conditions may allow workers to have far more power than 
usually ascribed to them in literature.
Autonomy in Regulated Environments 
Differences in structure may have implications for our understanding of scientific 
management. Scientific management seeks to control workers thus reducing their 
autonomy. Reiter has described how McDonald’s has succeeded in applying Taylorism to 
the restaurant (1991). The high degree of regulation required by scientific management 
cannot be accomplished without a significant outlay o f resources. The computers and 
other labor saving devices require investments of capital that is assumedly not available 
to all potential franchisees. Some restaurant owners make far less use of technology and
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laborers than do others. Within the rubric o f fast food, there are a number o f restaurateurs 
who employ scientific management, but not to the degree to which McDonald’s has been 
able to do so. Grinders and Ana’s represent two such restaurants. Both employ scientific 
management to bring about a formally rational plan of action. However, neither have the 
resources to coerce workers to act as closely to the model, as McDonald’s. The absence 
of capital investment in scientific management presents a structural contribution to the 
ability of employees to increase their personal autonomy. To the extent, that employers 
fail to deskill laborers, employers must depend on the abilities of their employees 
(Braverman 1974). Although, Anna’s and Grinders have a formally rational way of 
performing most tasks, workers in both restaurants are under less of a structural 
obligation to follow the prescriptions exactly. In other words, an absence o f capital 
investment in differentiation and technology can increase potential autonomy. This 
finding would partially explain why the employees at Grinders and Anna’s possessed 
more autonomy than did employees at the restaurants studied by Garson (1988) and 
Reiter (1991). Workers who seek to increase their autonomy do so through a process of 
negotiation. Franchisees do not simply grant autonomy because they do not have the 
means to control workers. They often make demands that are similar to their counter 
parts in capital-intensive restaurants. However, franchisees at less structurally 
differentiated restaurants will be more likely to concede autonomy to workers that 
implicitly or explicitly push for greater autonomy. O f course, the degree o f autonomy 
afforded to individual laborers is subject to continual processes o f negotiation.
The data suggest that autonomy may become a bargaining piece in employee- 
employer negotiations. Workers may seek to exploit structural features such as a labor
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shortage or high turnover by negotiating for increased autonomy. Workers, who are not 
interested in a minimal wage increase, might try to avoid undesired job tasks (i.e. I don’t 
clean toilets”) or controlling their availability (i.e. refusing to work weekends or 
evenings). However, if  this worker wishes to earn more money, either through promotion 
or increased hours, the worker may negotiate for this end by sacrificing autonomy. An 
employee who was previously unwilling to work nights or weekends may find himself 
closing the restaurant on a Saturday night. Likewise, employers may concede increases in 
autonomy once employees have reached the limits o f what he or she will pay in wages. 
Fast food restaurants are based on paying employees low wages. Oftentimes, workers 
will leave their position when they are able to earn higher wages elsewhere (Chamer and 
Fraser 1984). Employers may find that certain employees are more valuable than what he 
or she can afford to spend. An employer may negotiate to retain an employee by offering 
increased autonomy in place of higher wages. For instance, an employer may allow a 
core employee to set his or her schedule, avoid unwanted job tasks, choose the radio 
station, receive visitors, or use the telephone. An employee may accept an increase in 
autonomy in place o f an increase in wages. In short, we may observe an exchange of 
autonomy for financial compensation in the fast food restaurants.
Negotiations of Social Order 
The findings o f this study go beyond conclusions about fast food restaurants. The data 
support and add to the negotiated order perspective, consequently, leading to a better 
understanding o f social order and how it is achieved through interaction. The data allow 
us to come closer to an understanding of the interplay between agency and social 
structure as well as rationalization and autonomy.
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As stated previously, the assumptions o f the negotiated order perspective are that 
social order depends on negotiation, social structure influences negotiations, negotiations 
must be continually renewed in response to structural changes, and negotiations are 
impermanent (Fine 1996:3-4). The data support these assumptions. In the highly unstable 
world o f the fast food restaurant employees may resign or be terminated with little 
advance notice. It is not unusual for, both the employee and employer to be capable of 
replacing the other. However, all things being equal it is frequently easier to continue a 
business relationship than to find a new job or train a new employee respectively. 
Therefore, employees and employers have incentive to maintain the relationship; in spite 
of the conflict that is an intrinsic component o f their relationship. Employees and 
employers cooperate with each other through the process of negotiation. This cooperation 
is not created in a vacuum. The second assumption of the negotiated order perspective is 
that structural features influence negotiations. The data show that the negotiations 
between different parties in a fast food restaurant are far from equal. Employers are far 
more powerful than are their employees. Although, employers depend on their 
employees, the ability of the employer to dismiss employees and set the terms of 
employment stacks the proverbial cards firmly in favor of the house. The power that 
employers wield is dependent upon structural variables that are subject to change. The 
third and fourth assumptions of the negotiated order perspective are supported by the 
observation that as the structural context of the restaurant changes the social order must 
be renegotiated. A change in the unemployment rate, the number of similar restaurants in 
the area, the building of a new road, demographic shifts, and so on may influence the 
power that workers and franchisees possess relative to each other. For example, in this
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study, factors that led to an increase in the number of customers often necessitated a 
renegotiation of the social order. The holiday that caused a drastic increase in business 
resulted in a number o f negotiations o f the social order at Grinders.
This study supports many o f the conclusions of Morgan who applied the negotiated 
order perspective to the analysis of a factory (1975). Unlike many studies of negotiated 
order, Morgan examined a highly regulated setting. He found that negotiation is present 
even in organizations where some actors have little power in relation to others. Morgan 
argues that negotiation may be either implicit or explicit (1975). This study expands upon 
Morgan’s research by applying many of his findings to the analysis o f fast food 
restaurants. Fast food restaurants, like factories, are subject to the process of 
rationalization, which has systematically reduced the power and autonomy of lower level 
workers. As in Morgan’s factory, particular issues may be negotiated implicitly or 
explicitly (1975). This study supports Morgan’s observation that even the most formally 
rational organizations rely on negotiation to accomplish social order. From this research, 
we cannot go so far as to claim that all social orders are maintained through negotiation. 
For instance, the findings of this research may not be applicable to “sweat shops,” or 
internment camps. Although Erving Goffinan’s, Asylums, certainly points to the 
possibility that processes o f negotiation contribute to the maintenance o f even the most 
repressive social orders (1961). We might speculate that in any organization where 
persons in power depend on the cooperation of subordinates (particularly subordinates 
who may for one reason or another be capable of choosing to leave the organization) the 
social order will be maintained, in part, through processes of negotiation.
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The Imprecise Nature of Implicit Negotiation 
This study adds to Morgan’s research in a number of ways. In highly controlled 
environments, low-level workers may engage in implicit negotiations when explicit 
negotiation is unfeasible. Morgan treats implicit negotiation as if it is conducted for 
specific aims such as control o f time. While some forms of implicit negotiation may be 
conducted for specific issues, many times, implicit negotiations include actions that place 
persons in a position to demand different sets o f issues. For instance, the employee who 
actively moves from a periphery to core status within the restaurant may be implicitly 
negotiating for a set of issues (i.e. increased pay or increased authority). From this 
finding, we may surmise that negotiations may occur in various stages. The imprecise 
implicit type o f negotiation is typified by an employee who actively attempts to move 
from the periphery to the core, can be interpreted as a base level interpretation that places 
an actor in a position that allows her or him to make more precise negotiations. The 
employee who succeeds in becoming a core employee is in a better position to negotiate 
for increased wages or greater influence over the schedule. The movement fi-om 
periphery to core status is an act of negotiation, as it requires the individual to provide 
certain bargaining pieces (i.e. effort and responsibility) in exchange for an 
intersubjectively held understanding that a person is a part o f the core o f the group.
Status and Autonomy in Negotiations 
An employee’s level o f autonomy and status (as a periphery or core member) will 
influence which aims the employee can hope to reach. Status and autonomy are two 
variable axes that an employee may wish to alter in order to reach different sets of goals.
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The imprecise negotiation process can be illustrated by imaging the lived experience of 
two hypothetical employees.
Employee A begins her career at the restaurant as a periphery member with low 
autonomy. She exercises little influence issues that are negotiated because neither the 
crew nor the franchisee has come to depend on her. Employee A, in an effort to earn 
more money, does not push for greater autonomy (control of the schedule or job task 
assignment) rather she negotiates for increased wages and hours by working hard and 
efficaciously. After Employee A has attained what she interprets as the limits of her 
wages, she may use her core status to negotiate for increased autonomy. She may place 
limitations on her scheduling availability or what job tasks she will perform. The 
franchisee accepts these demands because he is not willing to pay her a higher wage, but 
he does not want her to resign.
Employee B has an opposite experience in the negotiations. Like Employee A, 
Employee B begins as a peripheral member with little autonomy. He is more interested in 
maintaining a balance between his personal life and his work life. As he becomes a core 
member, he negotiates for increased autonomy by placing limitations on which shifts he 
will accept. Because, he would be difficult to replace, the franchisee often accepts his 
scheduling limitations. However, should Employee B decide that he would like to 
increase his income; he may sacrifice his autonomy by decreasing his limitations on 
availability in exchange for more hours per week. Of course, these examples are 
oversimplifications. They are used to demonstrate the interplay between employee status 
and autonomy in the negotiated order of a fast food restaurant.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
12:
Individual Agency and Social Structure 
The negotiated order perspective can allow us to obtain a greater understanding 
of the relationship between individual agency and social structure. The data support the 
notion that social structure does not have a uniform affect on actors (Sugrue 1982; 
Altheide 1988). Rational individuals interpret their social environment before they 
choose to act. Two individuals may view the same job market quite differently. Of 
course, the interpretation of reality is not subject to purely rational processes. One’s 
interpretation of reality will undoubtedly be affected by one’s emotions or values. 
Additionally, we may conclude that social structure is impermanent. The structure must 
be continually renegotiated, cooperation is achieved through a process o f continual 
negotiation, individual motivations change, actors come, and go, and the definition of 
deviance is reworked. Social structure arises from interaction. Moreover, I have found 
that while the social structure will place limits on one’s agency, individuals are still 
capable o f maneuvering through the structure. Some individuals are able to exploit their 
own abilities to manipulate the social structure to their personal advantage, while other, 
less efficacious individuals will fail to achieve their desires.’
Lastly, this study allows us to come to a greater understanding of how the process of 
rationalization or as Ritzer (1993) has put it McDonaldization plays out in the lives of 
individuals. The act o f calculating a single best way of performing a specific task 
significantly reduces the autonomy of workers (Weber [1930] 1997; Braverman 1974; 
Ritzer 1998). This study does not dispute the fact that the process o f rationalization has 
steadily decreased the autonomy o f employees. However, at a micro level, a formally
' Demographic characteristics such as race, gender, and age will affect on the negotiation context. 
However, the nature and extent o f  these variables exceeds the scope o f  this study.
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rational plan may take on a different significance in the lives of individuals. By using the 
negotiated order perspective to examine specific formally rational workplaces, we may 
find that rationalization is not uniformly problematic for workers. In some instances, 
individual autonomy is far from ideal. Given the choice between autonomy and security, 
many workers will sacrifice autonomy. The freedom from control of the labor process 
may not benefit an employee who wants to expend as little energy as possible when at 
work (Leidner 1993). The employer who is less interested in controlling the labor process 
may be creating more work for employees who have to compensate for the lack of 
routinization with their own effort. The process o f having to interpret a single best way to 
negotiate a chaotic situation may be allow for greater autonomy and greater 
dissatisfaction on the part of the worker. However, there are times when an employee 
may want to increase his or her autonomy. The ability to receive visitors, choose the 
radio station, decide when to take a break, set one’s schedule, eschew certain job tasks, or 
any of the other issues that may be negotiated in a restaurant will depend on the 
existential actor. By using the negotiated order perspective that accounts for contextual 
factors, we may come to understand how individuals negotiate for their existentially held 
motivations. We may come to see how and when workers may strive to increase their 
autonomy, likewise we may discem situations where freedom is problematic.
Future Research
Future studies of negotiated order or fast food research may move in a number of 
directions from here. This study did not examine highly differentiated fast food 
restaurants. Will workers have an easier time negotiating with managers or the owner? 
Will the increase in differentiation completely reduce worker autonomy by narrowing job
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tasks thus further controlling the labor process? Does an increase crew size reduce the 
ability of management to supenhse workers, thereby creating a structural potential for 
increased autonomy? The increase in structural complexity will certainly alter the 
negotiation context, yet without empirical data we may only speculate as to how." 
Likewise, future researchers of the negotiated order perspective may focus on franchisees 
and their web of negotiations with their employees, property owners, suppliers, 
regulators, franchisor, and customers. Moreover, taking direction from Denzin’s analysis 
of the liquor industry one could study the various levels of society where the social order 
o f the fast food restaurants is maintained through negotiation (1977, 1978a). For 
negotiated order theorists, the data point to the importance o f examining highly regulated 
milieus. Future studies o f the disenfranchised may illustrate how individuals with little 
power achieve or fail to achieve their goals (prison inmates, welfare recipients, or sales 
clerks) through negotiation. These studies may improve the negotiated order perspective 
by adding to analytical concepts and strengthening existing sensitizing concepts such as 
implicit negotiation. Additional studies of the negotiated order perspective may 
incrementally develop a theory of negotiations, which, in turn, may allow sociologists to 
better understand the interplay between agency and structure.
■ The data presented by Reiter (1991). Leidner (1993), and Royle (2001 ) when compared with this study 
would lead us to believe that an increase in the division o f  labor reduces the autonomy o f  workers. 
However, we could be far more certain with an analysis o f  highly specialized restaurants from the 
negotiated order perspective.
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